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Austria-Hungary and the War

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AUSTRIA-HUNGARY AND THE WAR

Servia's Permanent Conspiracy and the "Mask Fallen from the Face of Russia"

By COUNT ALBERT APPONYI

[*Count Albert Apponyi, for 44 years one of the leading figures of Hungarian public life, was formerly Speaker of the Hungarian Parliament and later Minister of Education, and is a statesman of international repute, known all over the world for his activities on behalf of international arbitration, having been for years one of the active leaders of the Interparliamentary Peace Union.*]

I consider it highly important that the case for Austria-Hungary, in the present conflict of nations, should be put before the American public with minute precision.

We are all agreed in abhorring war and in deploring the outbreak of a catastrophe the like of which history has never witnessed. Those who are responsible for it will forever remain branded with a stigma of infamy which no amount of military or political success can wipe off their foreheads. Feeling as strongly as I do on that point, devoted as I am to the peace ideal, I consider myself qualified to proclaim before the whole world that my country is free from guilt in the horrible contest which has been forced upon her, and that she can face it with all the moral power of a pure conscience.

Servia's Territorial Ambitions End in the Present War

The direct cause of the outbreak is Servia's insane ambition to extend her dominion over those southern provinces of Austria-Hungary, Bosnia and Herzegovina to begin with, Croatia and the Slovene countries to follow, where South Slavs live in great numbers. Never could a small country like Servia nourish such designs against a great Power, unless it felt sure of being supported by some other great Power. Recent developments have shown that Servia had good reasons to expect such support. On behalf of the mad ambitions, not warranted even by the claims of racial kinship, since the Roman Catholic Croats generally abhor Servia, a constant agitation was organized in the aforementioned parts of Austria and Hungary. The origin of this

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agitation can be traced as far back as the accession of the Karageorgevich dynasty to the Servian throne. Under the Obrenovitch rule, Servia cultivated friendly relations with Austria-Hungary, to whom she was largely indebted for the recognition of her independence by the Berlin treaty of 1878. Things took a different shape when the last Obrenovitch king and his wife were murdered by military conspirators, and the present King, Peter Karageorgevich, unhesitatingly accepted the crown from the blood-stained hands of their murderers. For a short time the conscience of Europe seemed to wake, or at least a feeling of nausea prevailed among the civilized nations. King Peter found it difficult to enter into diplomatic relations with the governments of Europe. Russia alone did not scruple to take him for granted. The other Powers had to follow, England last of all. Finally recognition became universal.

The Permanent Conspiracy Against Austria-Hungary

From that time, Servia has been the seat of a permanent conspiracy against Austria-Hungary. Associations were formed for the "liberation of the South Slavonic brethren" in Austria-Hungary; agents were sent to undermine among our fellow citizens of South Slavonic race the feelings of allegiance to their country; wherever a traitor could be found among them, his services were enlisted; Bosnia and Herzegovina were almost openly claimed. These two Turkish provinces had been intrusted to Austria-Hungary's care by the Berlin treaty of 1878, because only the impartial rule of a Western Power could secure peace and liberty in a country inhabited by Mohammedans, Greek Orthodox, and Roman Catholic Christians. As a matter of fact, they throve and developed under the enlightened government of Austria-Hungary to a degree of welfare unknown in any other part of the Balkan peninsula. Nevertheless, Servia took hardly any pains to hide her covetousness concerning these provinces, where, under her rule, two-thirds of the population would be submitted to the same tyranny of racial and religious intolerance which the unhappy Bulgarians of Macedonia are experiencing at her hands. It was this covetousness which brought us to the verge of war in 1908, when Bosnia and Herzegovina were formally annexed to Austria-Hungary.

That was done precisely to shut the door against intrigues feeding on their ambiguous juridical status, which maintained

the Sultan's nominal sovereignty over them, while the whole power and the responsibilities of sovereignty belonged to Austria-Hungary. From the standpoint of international law, the annexation was certainly not exceptionable.

Turkey, whose nominal rights were set aside, had a right to protest, and so had the signatory powers of the Berlin treaty, but Servia had absolutely no voice in the matter. No right of hers was invaded, no legitimate interest of hers impaired; only mad pretensions were thwarted and unfair opportunities lessened. Still, it was Servia whose outcries, echoed by Russia, endangered the peace of Europe. Everybody knows how that first outbreak ended. Russia, Servia's patron and inspirer, recoiled at that time from the conflict with Germany which aggression against Austria-Hungary would have implied. So Servia had to declare herself disinterested in the arrangements concerning Bosnia, and willing properly to fulfil toward Austria-Hungary the duties of good neighborship. It was largely due to the exertions of the Hungarian Government, to which I belonged at that time, that Austria-Hungary accepted these verbal apologies and pledges, and that peace, or rather the semblance of peace, was preserved for some years more. I now almost regret this decision of ours. Had Servia's impudent behavior been chastised then, as it deserved to be, the present general conflict might have been averted. On the other hand, Austria-Hungary would not have shown that almost superhuman forbearance in which lies her clearest vindication. Anyhow, it is important to bear in mind that Servia's pretensions and designs brought matters to a crisis six years ago, and that she escaped punishment only through a solemn promise of correct behavior.

How was that promise kept? By doing worse from year to year, by developing with more energy still the propaganda of high treason among Austria and Hungary's South Slavonic citizens. Still more, since the results of such merely political work ripened too slowly, the pace was mended by setting up an additional organization for political assassination, headed by military and non-military officials of the Servian Kingdom. The thing would seem almost incredible but for the fact that the present Servian King's rule is based on murder, and that murderers are, or were, among his chief advisers. A government boasting of an origin like this must be expected to take a lenient view of political assassination. The matter was brought to light by Archduke

Franz Ferdinand's assassination. This dreadful crime, as has been established by the judicial inquiry, was not the work of a single fanatic. It was the carefully prepared result of a widespread conspiracy, centered in a great Servian national organization, the "Narodna Obrana," whose chairman is a general in active service, and whose rules contain a paragraph of dark meaning, bidding young men to prepare for "some big deed on behalf of the national cause." Well, Archduke Franz Ferdinand's murderers, all of them affiliated with the aforesaid organization, were prepared for the "big deed," and they performed it successfully. All the implements for the murder came from Servian army stores; bombs of the same origin were found hidden in many places; not a single accomplice of the crime could be laid hands upon on Servian ground; they found protection there instead of prosecution.

If circumstantial evidence has any meaning, the case against official Servia seems to be made out by these facts. But, what is more, the lamented Archduke's assassination was not the first, but, within two years, the fourth, attempt organized by the same gang of murderers against the lives of faithful public servants in the southern parts of Austria and Hungary.

Now, in the name of all that is human and just and fair, for how many years more should we have submitted to this? How many assassinations more should we have left unprevented, unpunished? What nation, big or small, can tolerate the setting up in her neighborhood of a whole machinery of treason and destruction, the organization of a permanent conspiracy against her moral cohesion, with murder lurking at every street corner, threatening the individual safety of her most valued citizens? Austria-Hungary had tolerated it long enough to feel her strength shaken, to see her power questioned, her destruction discounted, and her future ruler murdered. A little more of this and our fellow citizens of the South Slavonic race would have learned to doubt the Monarchy's capacity for defending the loyal and punishing the traitors; for making itself respected, even by small neighbors. In the face of such weakness on one side and such unscrupulous daring on the other, they might have wavered in their allegiance to a State unable to protect them.

It was high time to drag out treacherous assailants from the dark recesses of conspiracy into the broad daylight of plain speaking and open doing. We had to exact from official Servia,

whose moral complicity was established beyond doubt, efficient pledges, not words—which, in the case of confirmed liars, are valueless—but measures guaranteeing our tranquillity as a nation and the individual safety of our faithful public servants. Such pledges Servia would not give. She evaded the summons in her habitual manner of double dealing, granting a profusion of words, professions, and promises, whose mendacity was proved by experience, but recoiling from every measure really efficient. She was clearly resolved to go on with her work of sneaking aggression and to cultivate further her well-tried methods of conspiracy. Austria-Hungary would have been the laughing-stock not of her enemies only, but of her own citizens, had she feigned to believe where bad faith was manifest. There was no help for it. We had to set aside our extreme unwillingness to adopt violent measures. We had to strike or to resign our right to live.

The case was not arbitrable, nor fit to be submitted to an international inquiry. Before giving my support to any warlike step, I examined with the utmost care this side of the question, and, devoted though I am to the cause of international peace and to a constant expansion of its propaganda, I had to own that its arguments were of no use in the present case. Their applicability supposes good faith and a wish to do the right thing on both sides; failing these, honesty plays the part of a dupe.

What could have been the result of international proceedings against Servia? A verdict establishing her malpractices and bidding her to desist from them. Servia, of course, would have professed to submit, just as she professed to be a good neighbor after the crisis of 1908. In fact, she would have persisted in her dark work, somewhat cautiously perhaps at the beginning, more daringly afterward; and, in a couple of years, maybe after another series of attempted and successful assassinations, matters would again have ripened to a crisis. Should we then again have begun that parody of an international procedure which settles nothing because the adverse party hypocritically accepts and barefacedly evades every decision running against it? Should we have gone on rotting all the while and hastening toward dissolution? Really we could not do that; international institutions must not be converted into traps where honesty is caught and dishonesty enjoys good fun; they are meant to insure justice, not to further the designs of cheats. In the face of God and man do I proclaim: If ever there was a case of lawful self-defense, here you have it.

Nailing the Blame, Once and For All—Russia Being the Accused

But what about the universal war which grew out of a local conflict? Who is responsible for its horrors, for its calamities? The answer to this question is perfectly clear. Since Austria-Hungary was in a state of lawful self-defense against Servian aggression, those are responsible for the greater evil who espoused the cause of that aggression. And this is what Russia did. She is the great culprit. Her policy is the main fountain whence torrents of blood and of tears will flow. Her allies have been drawn by her into the concern. Not that I wish to extenuate the guilt and the disgrace of highly cultured nations like France and England, who became in some way the patrons and the associates of a gang of Servian murderers. But on Russia rests the chief responsibility; on her head falls the great sin against humanity implied in this war. From her face the mask has fallen, unveiling the lust of power and expansion which inspires her policy and which is the real source of every unrest in Europe.

In her war manifesto, Russia tries to pose as the chivalrous defender of a weak country against a strong one. That may appeal to the ignorant; in truth, it is barefaced humbugging. When Austria-Hungary had to coerce Servia, she solemnly declared that her only aim was to win those guarantees of her own tranquillity which Servia would not grant, but that neither Servia's territory nor Servia's independence would suffer any permanent mutilation. After that solemn declaration, made in the most binding form by a Power whose word is as good as any deed, there remained not the smallest pretext for honest interference.

Still, Russia did interfere. On whose behalf? On Servia's? After the pledges freely given by Austria-Hungary, Servia as a nation needed no protection; Austria-Hungary's coercive action was not directed against Servia, but only against the system of treacherous conspiracies and murderous attempts fostered by her present rulers. It is these dark forces alone that were threatened by our action in Servia. It is therefore on behalf of these, not of the weaker nation, which was perfectly safe, that Russia interfered. Russia does not wish Servia to become a decent country and a loyal neighbor; Russia drew her sword to make it possible that the conspiracies against Austria-Hungary's safety and the plots of murder implied in them should go on undisturbed; Russia stands behind that dark work with all her might and

power; it is part of her policy; through it should Austria-Hungary be kept in a state of constant unrest, economic difficulties and moral decomposition, till she became ripe for receiving the final blow! Because Austria-Hungary must disappear to make room for the program now openly proclaimed by the Czar—the union of all Slavs under Russian rule.

So the mask has fallen. Servia is a simple outpost; behind her stands the policy of Russia, supporting those treacherous and abominable acts which compelled unwilling Austria-Hungary to make a stand for her dignity and safety. Before the tribunal of human conscience stands Russianism, unveiled, as responsible for the horrors of universal war and for the permanent unrest that hereafter will consume Europe's forces. The power of Russianism must be broken before peace can be enjoyed with any amount of safety, before peace institutions can work with any degree of efficiency.

Well, since Providence puts its burden on our shoulders, that work will be done, with God's help, thoroughly. The greatness of the task is felt by every soul throughout Germany and Austria-Hungary, and absolute confidence reigns everywhere that our joined forces will be able to fulfil it. Even in Germany, there is no particular animosity against France. There is more of it against England, whose intervention is considered as a piece of revolting cynicism; but the chief object of popular resentment is Russia, which only shows the unerring instinct of the masses. And what I hear at home from simple-minded but honest and straightforward people like the day laborers on my own estate is a passionate desire to have it out once for all with Russia.

Disintegration Talk and Universal War and Pan-Slavism

It is clear, not from facts only, but from the Czar's explicit confession, that the policy of Russia pursues aims which can be attained only through universal war. The union of all Slavs under Russian dominion can be effected only after the disintegration of existing political bodies, Austria-Hungary to begin with, and by subjecting the non-Slav races encompassed by Slavs, such as the Hungarians and the Rumanians. Does that not mean war, horrible war, universal war, since neither the political bodies concerned will submit to destruction without making a desperate stand, nor the threatened races to subjection without fighting to the last? And doesn't it imply another confession of com-

plicity with Servia's conspiracies and crimes, which now appear quite distinctly for what they are, pioneer work on behalf of Russia?

But what would Russia's dominion over the whole mass of Slavs, the so-called Pan-Slavist ideals, mean from the standpoint of the great principles and ideals of progressive humanity? What would it mean to the Slavs themselves? It would mean, if a bad pun is to be allowed here, their transformation into slaves; it would mean to those among them who are now enjoying the bliss of civilized Western government and liberty a rolling down into the abyss of darkest tyranny; religious oppression for all those who do not conform to the Orthodox creed; a wiping out of racial differences as wide as the difference between German and Dutch, Italian and Spaniard; loss of every guarantee of individual and political liberty; arbitrary police rule which makes every man and woman liable to be arrested and transported without a trial, without a judicial verdict.

These and other similar blessings does Russia offer to those who are so happy as to fall into her loving embrace. And to all mankind, the grouping of all the forces of Slavdom under Russia's despotic power would mean the most horrible menace to enlightenment, progress, liberty, and democracy: A peril of cultural retrogression, a moral and social catastrophe.

THE ISSUES CLEARLY STATED

Former Austro-Hungarian Ambassador, Baron Hengelmüller, to Ex-President Roosevelt

ABBAZIA, SEPTEMBER 25, 1914.

MY DEAR MR. ROOSEVELT:

Now I write to you at the time of a most momentous crisis in the world's history, and I do so impelled by the desire to talk with you about my country's cause and to win your just and fair appreciation for the same. I wish I could address my appeal to the American people, but having no standing and no opportunity to do so, I address it to you as to one of America's most illustrious citizens with whom it has been my privilege to entertain during many years the most friendly relations.

Since the outbreak of the war our communications with America are slow and irregular. In the beginning they were nil. From the end of July to the middle of August we received neither letters, telegrams, nor papers. I suppose it was the same with

you concerning direct news from us. Our adversaries had the field all for themselves, and they seem to have made the most of it. To judge from what I have learned since, and from what I could glean in our papers, the New York press seem to have written about us and Germany very much in the same tone and spirit as they did about you during your last presidential campaign. I have seen it stated that the *Outlook* published an article in which Austria-Hungary was accused of having brought about the war through her greed of conquest and the overbearing arrogance of her behavior toward Servia. I do not know whether I cite correctly, as I have not seen the article, and I am aware that you have severed your connection with the *Outlook* after your return from Brazil. I only mention the statement as an illustration of what I have said above, for if a review of the standing of the *Outlook* opens its columns to such a glaringly false accusation the daily papers have certainly not lagged behind.

Servia Supplied the Spark

It is natural that our adversaries should be anxious to win the sympathies of the American people. So are we. But it is not for this purpose that I now write to you. Sympathy is a sentiment, and, as a rule, not to be won by argument. What I want to discuss with you are the causes of this war and the issues at stake.

Undoubtedly the war broke out over our conflict with Servia, but this conflict was not of our seeking. We had no wish of aggrandizement or extension of power at the expense of Servia; but Servia covets territory which belongs to us, and for years has pursued her ends by the most nefarious and criminal means. The assassination of our heir to the crown and his consort was not an isolated fact, but only the most glaring link in a long chain of plotting and agitating against us. This attitude of Servia toward us dates back to the day when the gang of officers who murdered their own king came to power, and when it became their policy to keep a hold over their own people by exciting their ambitions against us. This policy reached its first climax when we declared the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which we had occupied and developed for thirty years. You were in office then, and the events of the time are familiar to you. The crisis ended then by Servia's formal acknowledgment that our annexation violated none of her rights and by her

promise to cultivate henceforth correct and friendly relations with us. This promise was not kept. The plotting continued, lies were disseminated about a pretended oppression of our South Slav population, and associations were formed for the purpose of stirring them to discontent and, if possible, to treason. Things came to a second climax with the murder of Archduke Francis Ferdinand. The plot for this crime was hatched in Servia, the bombs and revolvers for its execution furnished there, and Servian officers instructed the murder candidates in their use. At last we could stand it no longer. What we wanted from Servia was the punishment of the plotters and accomplices, and a guarantee for normal relations in the future.

This was the object of our ultimatum. Servia made a show of complying with some of our demands, but in reality her answer was evasive.

Russia in the Background

These facts are exposed and authenticated in the note which we sent to the Powers after having presented our ultimatum in Belgrade, and in the memorandum which accompanied the same. I do not know whether the American papers had published these documents at the time. To-day, they are outstripped by greater events, but for the just appreciation of our proceedings in regard to Servia they remain indispensable.

In reality, however, our conflict with Servia was not the cause of the great war now raging, but only the spark which brought the over-loaded powder barrel to explosion. Who talks of Servia to-day, and who believes that France, England and Japan are making war on Germany and on us, because of Servia? The war broke out because Russia decided to shield Servia against the consequences of her provocations, and because, owing to preconcerted arrangements, the situation in Europe was such that the action of one great Power was bound to bring all, or nearly all, the others into the field. And again those preconcerted arrangements were the outcome of a mass of pent-up passions of hatred, envy and jealousy, the like of which—all Hague conference and pacific unions notwithstanding—the world had never seen before.

We were fully aware of the danger which threatened us from Russia when we formulated our demands in Belgrade. Russia's population is three times as large as ours, and it was not with a light heart that our Emperor-King took his final resolution.

Austria-Hungary a Unit

But our national honor and our very existence as a self-respecting Power were at stake. We could not hesitate. Now we are in a struggle for life and death, and we mean to carry it through with full confidence in the righteousness of our cause and in the force of our arms. In one respect, events have already belied the calculations of our enemies, who counted on internal dissensions within our own borders. I am happy to say that Croatians, Slovenes and a large majority of our own Servians are fighting in our ranks with the same valor and enthusiasm as Czechs, Rumanians, Poles, Magyars and Germans.

But why did Russia decide to assail us? During the whole 19th century she has shown herself a very shifty and unreliable protectress of Servia. She made use of the smaller country when it suited her own aggressive purposes against others, and she dropped it whenever it served her ends. It was so at the time of the Turkish war of 1877, and of the Berlin Congress, and it remained so until with the advent of the present dynasty, Servia offered a sure prospect of becoming and remaining a permanent tool in Russia's hands and a thorn in our flesh.

Russia is an aggressive Power. For two hundred years, she has extended her dominions at the cost of Sweden first, of Poland and Turkey afterward. Now she thinks our turn has come. Finding us to be in the way of her ultimate aims in the Balkan peninsula, she began to regard us as her enemy. For years the propaganda for undermining the bases of our Empire has been carried on in the name of Pan-Slavism. It seems that she judged that now the time had come to draw the consequences and to bring things to a final issue. With what results remains to be seen.

Russia and France

By the terms of our treaty of alliance, Germany was bound to come to our assistance if we were attacked by Russia. There was no secrecy about that treaty. Its text had been made public long ago, and its purely defensive character brought to the knowledge of the world. No more than we, did Germany entertain hostile intentions, or nourish hostile feelings against Russia. There was no clashing of interests to excite the first, no historical reminiscences to justify the second. If it is otherwise in Russia, it is because her present leaders find German power in the way

of their conquering aspirations against us. Germany, true to her obligations, hastened to our side when she saw us menaced, and when she declared war she did it because she had positive information that, in spite of formal and solemn assurances to the contrary, Russian mobilization was proceeding.

The terms of the Franco-Russian alliance have never been made public. Whether it was concluded merely for defensive or also for offensive purposes, and whether France was obliged by her treaty to draw the sword in the present case, remains therefore a matter of surmise. But there is no mystery about the feelings of France with regard to Germany, and no doubt about the greed for revenge which, during the last forty-four years, has swayed the overwhelming majority of her people, and been the dominant factor of her foreign policy. It was for this object that she entered into her alliances and agreements, and it is for this cause that she is fighting now.

It is simple hypocrisy to talk about German aggressiveness against France. France stood in no danger of being attacked by Germany if she had chosen to remain neutral in the latter's war with Russia. Asked whether she would do so she replied that her actions would be guided by her interests. The meaning of this reply was clear, and left Germany no choice. The formal declaration of war became, then, a mere matter of political and military convenience, and has no bearing on the moral issue of the case.

But Why England?

But why has England plunged into this war? Officially, and to the world at large, she has explained her resolution by Germany's violation of Belgian neutrality, and in the Royal message to Parliament it was solemnly declared that England could not stand by and passively tolerate such a breach of international law and obligation.

No Austrian or Hungarian can read this declaration otherwise than with a mournful smile. Its futility has been exposed by the question which Englishmen of standing and renown have put to their Government, viz.: whether they would equally have declared war on France if that violation of neutrality had first come from her side. In face of this question having remained unanswered, and in face of what has come to light since, about French preparations in Belgium, there is no need to expatiate on this subject. All that there is to be said about it has been

said by the German Chancellor in open session of the Reichstag, and all that may be added is the remark that, considering England's history and what she did before Copenhagen, in 1807, she of all nations should be the last to put on airs of moral indignation over the application of the principle that, in time of war, "*salus republicæ suprema lex esto.*"

The existence of a convention binding England to France, in case of war with Germany, has—as far as I know—never been admitted officially by England. As I see now from manifestations of Englishmen disapproving of their country's participation in the war, the belief exists, nevertheless, that such a convention had been concluded. But whether England's declaration of war was the consequence of previously entered obligations, or the outcome of present free initiative, the fact remains that in the last resort it sprang from jealousy of Germany's growing sea power and commercial prosperity. This feeling was the dominant factor in English foreign policy, just as greed for revenge was in France. This feeling was the propelling power for the agreements which England has made and for others which she endeavored but did not succeed to bring about.

Why Must England Rule the Seas?

England claims the dominion over the seas as her native right; and, what is more, she holds it. Her title to it is no better and no worse than that of the Romans when they conquered the world, or of the Turkish Sultans in the days of their power. Like them, she succeeded in making good her claim. For three centuries the nations of Continental Europe have been hating, fighting and devastating one another for the sake of strips of frontier land and a shadowy balance of power. These centuries were England's opportunity, and she has made the most of it. That she should mean to keep what she has and hold to her maritime supremacy, as to the apple of her eye, is natural. Whether it is for the benefit of mankind that it should be so, and whether the world in general would not be better off if there existed a balance of power on sea as well as on land, does not enter into the present discussion. What is more to the purpose is, that in reality, England's sea power stood in no danger at all. To any thinking and fair-minded observer it must be clear that Germany, hemmed in by hostile neighbors in the East and West, and obliged therefore to keep up her armaments on land, would not have been

able to threaten England's maritime superiority for generations to come. If the issue has been thrown into the balance, it has been done so by England's own doing.

But it is not only the nascent German navy that excited the distrust and envy of England. German colonies and every German trading vessel seems equally to have become a thorn in England's side. The wish to sweep those vessels from off the seas, to destroy all German ports, in one word to "down" Germany, has long been nourished and lately openly avowed in England. Mr. Norman Angell's theories about the great illusion of the profit of modern warfare seem to have made but small impression on his countrymen.

The Causes Summed Up

Russian lust of conquest, French thirst for revenge, and English envy were the forces at work in the European powder magazine. The Servian spark ignited it, but the explosion was bound to come sooner or later. What alone could have stopped it would have been England's stepping out of the conspiracy. That she did not do so, but, in fact became its really directing power, will forever remain a blot on her history.

About Japan's motives and methods I do not think it necessary to write. American public opinion will hardly need any enlightenment on this subject. America forced Japan out of the isolation in which she had lived during centuries. I hope the day may not come when she will wish that she had not done so.

The issues of the war stand in relation to its causes, and the same attempts have been made to distort and falsify them in the eyes of the American public. I have seen it stated in a New York paper that this war is a fight between civilization and barbarism, and I have seen a member of the present English Cabinet quoted as having said that the issue was one between militarism and freedom, civilization and freedom standing, of course, in both cases, on the side of our enemies.

More idiotic rot—excuse the expression—I have never read in my life. What has civilization to do with Servia's murderous plotting against us? What with Russia's desire to shield her from the consequences of her aggressions and to demonstrate to the world that we are of no account in the Balkans, and to establish her own—more or less veiled—protectorate there? And if the case of civilization is advanced by Japan's ousting Germany

from Kiaochow, why should it not be equally furthered if Japan did the same to England in Hongkong or Singapore, or, if the opportunity offered, in India itself? And a person must be indeed at his wits' end for arguments to proclaim Russia a standard-bearer of freedom in her war against us. Compare her treatment of Poles, Finns, Ukrainanians (Small Russians) and Hebrews with the freedom which the different nationalities enjoy in our Empire! And England herself! Is it for freedom's sake that she holds Gibraltar and that she subjugated the Boers?

No! Civilization and freedom have nothing to do with the issues at stake now, least of all in the sense as if our enemies had drawn the sword for their cause. It is a war for conquest and supremacy, stirred up by all the hateful passions in human nature, fully as much as any war that has ever been waged before. But we did not stir it up. We are fighting for our existence; right and justice are on our side, and so we trust will victory be.

The causes of the war are clear. To make its issues still clearer, imagine for a moment and merely for argument's sake the consequences of our adversaries' being successful. Russia, England and Japan would remain masters of the field. Is this a consummation any thinking American can wish for?

These are the considerations I wished to lay before you.

Yours most sincerely,

BARON L. HENGELMÜLLER, M.P.

AUSTRIA'S CIVILIZING MISSION

Universal Suffrage upon the Initiative of the Emperor—Austria's Relations to Bosnia like those of the United States to Texas—Servia's Opposition to Austria's Beneficent Work

By AN AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN DIPLOMAT

At this portentous moment in history, when the activities of Austria-Hungary in the Near East have suddenly been made a world-issue by the outbreak of the most terrible war in the history of civilization, the aims and methods of the dual Monarchy are of paramount significance.

Situated upon the outskirts of central Europe, in the debatable region between the West and the East, Austria stands in a peculiar sense as the connecting link between civilization and

vanishing barbarism, between to-day and yesterday. The double eagle of Austria is the symbol that connects racial fragments in a civic bond which spells progress and peace. The aims of Austria, whether in the Balkans or further east, are mainly commercial and cultural. They are political only in so far as the geographical situation of the dual Empire makes it incumbent upon her statesmen to maintain her territorial integrity and to provide for the normal expansion of her industrial output.

The attempt to centralize and Germanize the Austrian Empire as a whole has been twice made—once under Emperor Joseph II., toward the end of the eighteenth century, and again under Francis Joseph, after the suppression of the revolution of 1848. In each case the attempt failed, and it was abandoned as impracticable by the present Emperor-King. Hungary had always retained its old liberties under the hegemony of the Magyars. By the compromise of 1867 the dual form of the Monarchy was definitely fixed. So carefully were the rights of the various races in the Empire safeguarded under this readjustment that in Hungary, for instance, the Croatians were recognized as a separate entity, under their own Ban or Governor, with their separate diet and their distinct machinery of local and provincial administration.

In Austria proper, the constitution of 1867 created a central parliament in Vienna and left a large measure of autonomy to the old provinces. One of the most important articles of the constitution guarantees to every nationality the free use of its language "in word and writing." By this means, it made forever impossible any attempt to interfere with the legitimate aspirations of the various races in the Empire. In fact, the entire spirit of the new constitution was to assure to each race the greatest and freest use of its language in its educational system, from the primary school to the university, in the diets, in the provincial legislatures and in the administration, excluding only the ministries at Vienna, and in the courts, with the sole exception of the Supreme Court in the Imperial Capital.

Even to this last reservation in favor of a central authority an exception is made. In Polish litigation the entire process of litigation and judicature, including the highest court, may be carried on in the Polish language.

Only in the army, common to the Empire, is there a common language, and that language is the German. This arrangement

is not based upon any propaganda, but is the outcome of the entirely practical consideration that an army made up of so many races as is the Austro-Hungarian would be badly handicapped in the performance of its duties if it did not have a common language of command and communication. The selection of the German language for this purpose was the logical outcome of the German origin of the Empire.

The tangible result of this practically unlimited freedom of race-development is presented by the present complexion of the Reichstag in Vienna. So long as the franchise was based upon property qualifications the votes of the landed proprietors kept a disunited German majority in the Reichstag, but the granting of universal suffrage upon the personal initiative of the Emperor a few years ago resulted in the return of a Slavic majority in the Imperial legislative chamber—a remarkable result if one is to believe the persistent charges that Austria has sought to destroy or Germanize the Slavic nationalities within its boundaries.

This presence of a Slavic majority in the chamber has brought about a state of affairs wherein no Austrian administration can neglect the wishes of the Slavic groups without being forced to resort to the short-lived and unpopular expedient of Imperial decrees.

Thanks to its liberal treatment of the claims of contending nationalities, the German element in many parts of Austria is already on the defensive, and the ascendancy of the Slav element is more and more felt in the political and intellectual life of the Empire. The Slav has taken the offensive all along the line, and the Germans have lost many important positions in the civil and financial administration and in the courts. Bohemia is the center of the Slavic movement. In Prague, the capital of Bohemia, the new Czech university is a dangerous rival to the old German university, the renowned Carolina, founded in 1348 by the Emperor Charles of Luxemburg. This Czech university has become the focus of Slav science, literature, and thought—and, unfortunately, also of Pan-Slavic agitation, as hundreds of Servian and Croatian students have flocked to its gates to be imbued with the dreams of the future universal Slavic domination.

In the midst of these contending racial forces, the mission of Austria has been, first, to introduce among the great Slavic populations within her borders the ideals of German culture and German civilization. Her greatest achievements in this direction

have been attained in Bohemia. It is recognized by the Slavic world universally that the Slavic movement in Prague is the outcome of German culture inculcated by Austria. It is one of the tragic circumstances of history that the German culture imparted to the Czechs is now operating in favor of the Pan-Slavic cause, intellectual and political.

In the east, the mission of Austria has been suggestively indicated by the flow of the Danube. Eastward and southward, with the current of the mighty river, have Austrian cultural and industrial activities gone hand in hand. And one of the earliest stations of the commercial and moral expansion—the stations of Austria's *Drang nach Osten*—are Bosnia and Herzegovina.

The destinies of Bosnia and Herzegovina came under the purview of Austria in 1876–77, when the revolutionary movement in the provinces, in conjunction with the Servian war against Turkey, was suppressed with unexampled severities by the Ottoman Government. At that time, the natural refuge for the stricken Christians of Bosnia-Herzegovina was Austria. Two hundred thousand of them were cast upon the resources of the authorities, and had to be taken care of. As there was no promise of an immediate amelioration of the stricken provinces, the question of the day at Vienna became the final solution of the problem of introducing order and personal security in the territory infested by brigands and terrorized by official severities, just across the Turkish border.

The relation of Austria to Bosnia and Herzegovina duplicated in a marked degree that of the United States and Texas during the Texan uprising against Mexico, and the solution of the problem in the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina, as in that of Texas, appeared to be an Austrian occupation. This destiny of the distracted provinces was recognized by the Congress of Berlin, which adjusted the affairs of southeastern Europe after the defeat of Turkey by Russia in 1877. The Congress, after a thorough balancing of international interests and international jealousies, handed over the two provinces to Austria for pacification and administration, and conceded to Austria the right to occupy the Sanjak of Novibazar, the narrow strip of territory which lay between Servia and Montenegro. This occupation was in the nature of a condominium with Turkey.

Installed in Bosnia-Herzegovina by the mandate of Europe, Austria entered upon its task of cleaning the Augean stable of

Bosnian affairs with an energetic realization of the difficulties of its undertaking. The first obstacle that confronted the newly installed authorities was an uprising of the Begs, or Mohammedan nobility. Aroused by the land-owning Moslems, secretly instigated by the Sultan, they undertook to oppose by force of arms the peaceful entrance of Austria into its new functions. The outcome of the contumacy of the Begs was a six months' war, which ended in the suppression of the Moslem resistance and the restoration of internal peace. Next, Austria undertook the task of clearing out the brigands who infested the country and made travel and commerce practically impossible.

Side by side with measures for the pacification of the provinces and the restoration of internal order, the new Austrian administration accomplished wonders in the construction of a system of roads, the first that Bosnia and Herzegovina had had since the Ottoman conquest.

The land question in the newly occupied provinces was extremely delicate. When Austria marched into Bosnia she found there a survival of the feudal ages in the distribution of the land. The entire area of the provinces, with rare exceptions, was owned by the Begs, and the tenants, who cultivated them for the scant reward of one-half the produce, were in a condition of peonage. Two alternative solutions of the question presented themselves. One was the forcible expropriation of the lands of the nobles, and the other was the gradual distribution of the holdings through a period of years.

It is one of the foremost grievances of the Servian agitators on the Austrian border provinces that the administration of the dual Monarchy did not at once proceed with the seizure of the land and its distribution among the peasantry by arbitrary means, a method employed by the Servians after the fall of the Ottoman Power in Servia. Such, however, was not the Austrian method of dealing with the rights of property, and it had been understood by the signatories to the Treaty of Berlin that no agrarian revolutionary measures would be undertaken by Austria.

Baron Kallay, the first Austrian civil administrator of Bosnia-Herzegovina, however, adopted the much more equitable and on the whole far more successful plan of encouraging thrift among the peasants, and at the same time enabling them to achieve independence by their gradual acquisition of the lands they cultivated. This conservative reorganization of the agrarian system

of the country was accomplished through the aid of the Land Bank of Bosnia, an institution of private finance under the rigid supervision of the Government. Baron Kallay's project, which produced highly satisfactory results, was carried on by his successors, Burian and Bilinski.

The educational problem of the provinces was no less difficult than that presented by the distribution of the land. When Austria entered Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1878, she found no schools there, with the exception of a few mosque classes and madrasahs for the chanting of Arabic prayers and verses from Al Koran. Far from attempting to make German the language of the people, or even the language of the more highly educated among them, the Austrian authorities at once undertook the establishment of native schools, in which the instruction should be carried on in Serb or in Croatian, the former written in the Cyrillic or Bulgarian alphabet, and the latter in Latin characters. Not only was no attempt made to introduce German schools, but the Government declined to permit the expenditure of public money for instruction in any language except the two named idioms of the Slavic language.

This liberal policy stands out in sharp contrast to the destructive activities of the Servians in the newly occupied Macedonian lands, where they have closed all the Bulgarian schools amid circumstances of severity, to which some reference is made in the Report of the Carnegie Commission. Certainly there is nothing in the establishment of Serb schools by Austria in Bosnia and Herzegovina to justify the contention of the Servians that Austria is seeking to crush out Serb nationality under the rule of the double eagle.

Nevertheless, the Servian propaganda in Bosnia and Herzegovina, following closely the Servian propaganda in its first stage in Macedonia, was conducted along cultural lines, quite regardless of the palpable fact that the people of Servia themselves stood in need of all the cultural efforts of which their Government and their financial resources were capable. This fact is easily demonstrable when it is remembered that in 1909 the Slavs of Bosnia and Herzegovina, after thirty years of Austrian administration, stood educationally higher than any of the independent Slavic nations of the Balkan Peninsula. Despite the manifestly hostile purposes of the so-called cultural Servian propaganda in the border provinces, the Austrian authorities

took no measures to oppose it until it had entered the phase of bomb-throwing, in which the Servians had become adepts in the course of their abortive struggle for the conversion of Macedonia to Serbism. And that final and intolerable phase of the Serb nationalist propaganda was close at hand. The crisis began in 1909, when the Austrian Government declared the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

This annexation was based upon three essential considerations, each one of which would have been considered sufficient in itself by any nation. The first of these considerations was the mandate of Europe; the second was the right of conquest, established at the beginning of the occupation by the suppression of the armed resistance of the recalcitrant Begs; the third was the expenditure of about $250,000,000 by the dual Monarchy for the construction of railroads and other means of communication, public works of various sorts, and education and local improvements; and the fourth was the duty of continuing a régime which had brought peace and prosperity to the country itself. All the signatories to the Treaty of Berlin readily acquiesced in the accomplished fact as a logical outcome of actual events.

Servia, however, conceived that it had been robbed by the act of the Austrian Government, and the press of that country launched a campaign of bitter and indecent vilification against the dual Monarchy. The contention of the Serbs that they were entitled to the annexed provinces was based upon two considerations, both equally absurd. The first was that Bosnia and Herzegovina had been a part of the great Servian Empire under Stefan Dushan about five hundred years ago. This argument may best be compared with a Mexican claim to Texas because that State had formerly been a part of Mexico. And the Servian pretension to Bosnia-Herzegovina is very much weaker than the hypothetical Mexican claim to possession of Texas, because the inclusion of the contested provinces in the gigantic Empire of Dushan (The Strangler), which was only one-tenth as large as the State of Texas, lasted, as did the Empire, only about twenty years.

The second basis of the Servian claim to Bosnia-Herzegovina is the allegation that the provinces are inhabited by people of Serb race, of Servian language and of Serb faith. Not one of these contentions even approaches the facts. Out of the provinces' total population, which does not quite amount to two

millions, 800,000 only are, at the very utmost, Orthodox Serbs. The remainder are Roman Catholic Croatians, whose written language the Orthodox Serb cannot even read unless he has a knowledge of the Latin characters, or Mohammedans, who heartily detest the Servians and profoundly despise them.

The frothing protests which the Servian press continued to make against the annexation, it was realized clearly at Vienna, were instigated partly from St. Petersburg, where the statesmen saw, or pretended to see, a fresh sign of Austrian encroachment upon the Southern Slavs, those dear Southern Slavs whose destinies have been for centuries the pawns on the chessboard of Russian diplomacy. But the Russian statesmen did not observe, or, observing, did not care to admit, that Austria, while annexing Bosnia and Herzegovina, had definitely abandoned her alleged road to Salonika by the withdrawal of her troops from the Sanjak of Novibazar, which was the key to the military situation in any advance farther south and east. A glance at the map will convince even the most hostile critic of Austrian policy in the Balkans that the abandonment of Novibazar by Austria is incompatible with any suspicion of an Austrian design of territorial expansion in the direction of Salonika or of Constantinople.

Thus events wore on toward the culminating tragedy of Sarajevo. In 1913, the Serbs had attained a wild dream through the annexation of a large part of Bulgarian Macedonia by the defeat of Bulgaria in the second Balkan War. The Servian campaign in Bosnia-Herzegovina, following out its previous metamorphosis in the Macedonian agitation that preceded the alliance with Bulgaria for the first Balkan War, emerged from the "cultural" stage and entered the bomb-throwing phase. The assassination of the Archduke Francis Ferdinand and his consort at Sarajevo by a young Serb patriot last summer startled the world and compelled Austria to energetic action in order to check a political and racial movement which had degenerated into a conspiracy to commit murder.

The tremendous events which have cast the world in gloom since July 23d are the outcome of Servia's resistance to Austria's demand for a cessation of this orgy of violence. The Servians have opposed Austria's civilizing mission with unpardonable venom, and Austria has not flinched before the task of undertaking to crush that opposition.

WHY AUSTRIA-HUNGARY IS AT WAR WITH RUSSIA

By DR. CONSTANTIN THEODOR DUMBA
Ambassador to the U. S. of America

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The war between Austria-Hungary and Russia may well be said to be the outcome of conflicting civilizations and conflicting aims. The controversy between the dual Monarchy and the Servian Kingdom is only an incident in the greater struggle between German civilization, as represented by Austria-Hungary, and Russian aspirations on the southern frontier of the dual Monarchy. To a proper understanding of the conflicting trend of these two forces—Austria-Hungary and Russia—a realization of the respective interests of the two Powers in the Near East is essential.

Our interest in the Near East is economic, and not at all nationalistic. Russia's interest is solely sentimental or nationalistic. The Monarchy was the dominant trade factor in the Balkan States. Russia has no trade worth mentioning, either in Servia or in any other Balkan State. The Gagarin line of steamers on the Danube, which Russia maintained at great cost, carried hardly any freight to Belgrade, except supplies for the Russian minister in the Servian capital. Austria-Hungary sent merchants and commercial travelers into the Balkan States. Russia, on the other hand, sent priests, consuls, agitators, and apostles of the Slavic idea.

The natural expansion of the German Empire of Austria toward the Near East began after the permanent expulsion of the Turkish hordes by the victories of Prince Eugene of Savoy. Parallel with the Austrian expansion .southeastward went the Russian advance toward the Black Sea. In an effort to avert a clash in this parallel but gradually concentering expansion, Emperor Joseph and Empress Catharine met late in the eighteenth century—1787—in the Crimea, and reached an agreement for the dismemberment of Turkey. Under this project of monarchs, the western part of the Ottoman Empire, including Bosnia-Herzegovina, now the bone of contention between the Monarchy on the one hand and Russia and Servia on the other,

was apportioned to Austria. To Russia's share were allotted the regions now known as Rumania and Bulgaria. It was at this period that the Russian dream of the possession of Constantinople, first broached in the form of a mythical will of Peter the Great, began to assume reality as a governing principle of Russian policy in southeastern Europe.

Decisions of the Congress of Berlin

In the nineteenth century, Metternich, in vain, tried his conservative policy for the maintenance of the territorial integrity of Turkey. The Monarchy's championship of Turkey as a permanent territorial and political entity in Europe failed because of Russia's persistent aggressions. At the Congress of Berlin, in 1878, which adjusted the boundaries of the Balkan Peninsula after the Russo-Turkish War, Count Andrassy abandoned this policy of Prince Metternich. Under the treaty negotiated in Berlin, the independence of the kingdoms of Servia and Rumania was recognized and the tributary principality of Bulgaria was created. In these arrangements the principle of nationality was the predominant consideration. Count Andrassy's chief interest in the proceedings of the Congress on behalf of Austria-Hungary was commercial, as Russia's was sentimental or nationalistic.

Andrassy sought to secure an outlet for our industrial products. This attitude was in accord with Austria's previous dealings with Balkan peoples. He first concluded a commercial treaty with Rumania before it was an independent kingdom. Accordingly, one of the clauses which were incorporated into the Treaty of Berlin at Austria's behest placed Servia under the obligation to reach a commercial understanding with the dual Monarchy. But even this obligation Servia carried out only under great pressure from Vienna.

Another outcome of the Congress of Berlin—and a fateful one, as now appears—was the mandate of the Powers for the occupation of the provinces of Bosnia-Herzegovina by Austria-Hungary for purposes of pacification and administration.

The relations between the Monarchy and Servia in the first years of the new order of things were satisfactory and harmonious. Hand in hand with the economic dependence of Servia upon Austria-Hungary as the main and almost exclusive outlet for Servian commerce, went a political intimacy between King Milan's administration and the Government at Vienna. But

against this friendly relation the Radical Russophile party carried on an energetic campaign. This campaign was supported at much cost by Russia, which conferred scholarships upon hundreds of Servian students in Russian universities, and educated many Servian officers in Russian military colleges. In addition to these cultural efforts of the Russian Government, the so-called Slavic Benevolent Society in Moscow and St. Petersburg always stood ready with ample funds to give material support to all poor Serbs who should show a desire to avail themselves of the educational facilities of the Russian Empire. Such were the mild beginnings of the Russian propaganda in Servia, which was destined to lead to a tragic climax in Sarajevo a few years later.

Russia and Servia

After the assassination of King Alexander, son of King Milan, and Queen Draga in June, 1903, the Russophile Radical party, under Nikola Pasitch, the present premier, came into complete and almost undisputed control in Belgrade. Under King Peter, the successor of King Alexander, the Russian minister at Belgrade assumed the rôle of a sort of viceroy. Russian dominance over Servian affairs was especially conspicuous under the late Baron Hartwig, who was at the head of the Russian legation in the Servian capital during the two Balkan wars and until his death a few weeks ago.

Under the influences set at work by Russia, the attitude of Servia toward Austria-Hungary underwent a complete reversal. As Austro-Hungarian minister to Servia in the last part of the reign of King Alexander, I often discussed with the King or his ministers the destiny of Servia.

They all seemed to take it for granted that the door to the west had been closed to the Servian nation by the Austro-Hungarian occupation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and only the door to the south—in Macedonia—was open. Servia had given up the dream of a Servian expansion at the expense of the Monarchy, and was considering conquests to the south, in Old Servia. Accordingly, the activities of the nationalistic societies under the department of propaganda at the Servian Foreign Office were cultural. They took the form of the establishment of schools and churches in Macedonia for the spread of the national ideal, very often at the expense of the Bulgarians. This purely educational campaign lasted until the sudden end of the reign of

Alexander. Under King Peter began the propaganda of action which was destined to have a tragic counterpart in the assassination of the Archduke Francis Ferdinand and his consort in Sarajevo.

Bands of raiders, or comitadjis, were organized, armed with bombs and rifles, and sent into the debatable territory of Macedonia to convince Bulgarians and other nationalities that they were really good Serbs. These methods, until the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina was announced by Austria in 1908, were applied only to Macedonia. After that event, the activities of the propaganda under the inspiration of Russia were transferred to Austrian and Hungarian territory.

Russia's Interests

The active interest of Russia in the newly annexed lands came in the wake of two rebuffs for Russian arms and Russian diplomacy. During Russia's struggle with Japan, the Monarchy had maintained the friendliest relations with Russia, in the hope that the colossus of the North would succeed in retaining its outlet in the Far East. With the triumph of Japan in Manchuria, Russia swung back to a keen revival of interest in the affairs of the Near East. But the second disappointment—this time a failure for Russian diplomacy—was to come.

It is the custom to speak of the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina as having been carried out by Austria to the accompaniment of profound secrecy. Such is not the case.

The Monarchy, before the formal act, had exchanged several friendly notes on the subject with Russia. It is not generally known that Russia had even given her conditional approval of the plan of annexation in advance of its execution. At a conference in the Castle of Buchlau, in Moravia, in the autumn of 1908, Baron von Aehrenthal, the Austro-Hungarian Minister of Foreign Affairs, had obtained the consent of Iswolski, his Russian colleague, to the prospective step. In return for Russia's friendly attitude in the matter, von Aehrenthal pledged to the Russian Foreign Minister Austria-Hungary's consent to the opening of the Straits of Constantinople to the Russian fleets.

When Iswolski, on continuing his trip, presented this plan to the British Foreign Office, he was quickly convinced that the agreed-upon *quid pro quo* was impracticable. Then began the opposition of Russia to the annexation by Austria-Hungary of

the country which had been rescued from anarchy and placed upon the road to progress by Austrian arms and statesmanship, and in which Austria-Hungary had expended vast sums for essential improvements. This opposition was voiced by the Russian press in a series of violent utterances and by Servia in a campaign of incendiary and indecent attack upon the dual Monarchy. Servia's defiant attitude lasted from October, 1908, until the following March. Austria-Hungary was then compelled to proceed at great cost to a partial mobilization as a defensive measure.

Annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina

In point of fact, the annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina was neither a stealthy nor an unforeseen event. On the eve of the opening of the Russo-Turkish War, Austria, like England, had set down conditions for its neutrality in the coming conflict. The Monarchy, among other considerations, stipulated the acquisition of control in Bosnia, and Great Britain for the inviolability of the Straits of Constantinople. Both these conditions Russia sought to evade after the defeat of Turkey. England enforced the performance of Russia's promises by the dramatic appearance of its fleet in Besika Bay; the Monarchy obtained the performance of Russia's part of the bargain with the dual Monarchy at the hands of the Congress of Berlin.

Despite the double assent which Russia had given to our control in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Russia picked out the Bosnian issue as the key-note of a wide appeal to all Slavic nations as an example of the "Austrian peril." Russia is extremely reactionary in its domestic policies and extremely revolutionary in its foreign policies. The character of the Russian agitation carried on in the Austrian Slavic provinces may well be designated as revolutionary. The courts in Hungary only recently finished consideration of a characteristic method of Russian propaganda on Hungarian territory. Several Ruthenians, whom the Russians call Malorussi—"Little Russians"—were convicted of high treason under the cover of religion. The chief witness for the defense was the Pan-Slavist leader Bobrinski, a member of the Russian Duma, who had come from Russia to appear before the court under a pledge of immunity. It was shown in the course of the testimony that a swarm of Bobrinski's paid agents had agitated among the Austrian and Hungarian Ruthenians, ostensibly in an effort to detach them from the United Orthodox to the Russian

Orthodox Church, but actually in an attempt to develop anti-Austrian sentiment among these "lost children" of Russia. Bobrinski's guilt of the charge of plotting against the peace of a friendly State was proved with sufficient conclusiveness, but it was impossible to convict him because of the promise of immunity under which he had consented to appear on Hungarian soil.

Threatening Bulgaria

The trial and the disclosures which it brought about created a profound feeling of resentment throughout Austria and Hungary. The Hungarian Government had caught Bobrinski—and behind Bobrinski something that loomed like a menacing cloud up in the North.

Any approach to the hard methods of Kaulbars would not be endured with patience by any great Power. Kaulbars, with his Russian diplomatic entourage, terrorized Bulgaria during the period of uncertainty that followed the abduction, on the 9th of August, 1886 (old calendar), of Prince Alexander, by Russian agents, from his bed in the palace. With Alexander out of the way, Kaulbars, assuming the powers of a viceroy under suspended constitutional guarantees, attempted to browbeat and intimidate the Bulgarian regency, and actually made a deliberate and systematic attempt to promote a revolution against the Government, by informing the people, in fiery proclamation and by a series of speeches throughout the country, that the Government had incurred the displeasure of the Czar, and that, therefore, Bulgaria would suffer untold evils unless it quickly compelled its rulers to obey the mandate of Alexander III.

The extraordinary methods of Kaulbars and his masters at St. Petersburg produced such a strong wave of indignation in Vienna that the Monarchy at that early stage was brought to the brink of war against Russia in defense of the independence of Bulgaria.

The strings that led from Prague, the capital of Bohemia, to St. Petersburg and Moscow, the center of the Pan-Slavistic movement, were estimated as ominous and significant symptoms. The frequent pilgrimages of prominent Slavic leaders—like Kramar and Klofac, the Czechs, to St. Petersburg or Belgrade, and the numerous Sokol congresses and conferences, within and outside of the limits of the Monarchy, were outward signs of the intense character of a determined and dangerous agitation.

The Government of the dual Monarchy has been taught by experience that the Servian Kingdom is the torpedo which Russia has launched at the body of the Monarchy. That is why the Austro-Hungarian Government, in its dealings with Servia after the crime of Sarajevo, found no alternative to insistent and uncompromising action. Any quibbling, any half-measures in repressing such intolerable activities as have characterized the Russo-Servian propaganda on Austrian territory, would have perpetuated the peril and made the situation worse than it was. It would have been tantamount to abdication by the Monarchy of its sovereignty on its own soil. And such an abdication we are not yet prepared to make. It must vindicate its sovereignty and insure order within its boundaries, even at the risk of incurring the accusation of undue aggressiveness from those who do not realize that the patience of the dual Monarchy has been long and its desire for peace constant.

THE MEANING OF RUSSIAN PAN-SLAVISM

By ALEXANDER VON NUBER

Austro-Hungarian Consul-General

Russian Pan-Slavism is a revolutionary force. It first undermined Turkish rule in the Balkan Peninsula and then it turned its activities toward fomenting disaffection among the Austrian Slavs. The racial and religious kinship of Russia with the Slavs in Austria makes this agitation a menace to peace and order in the dual Monarchy.

The advanced posts of the Pan-Slavist movement in the Balkans are Servia and Montenegro. The relations between Russia and Montenegro are particularly close. Two daughters of the King of Montenegro are married to Russian grand dukes, one of them being Nikolai Nikolaievitch, the present commander-in-chief of the Russian armies and head of the war party in St. Petersburg.

The annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, although it was expected by everybody, aroused the Servian national passions to a frantic pitch. The Servian press indulged in venomous attacks upon the Hapsburg Monarchy. The whole attitude of the Servian nation was insolently provocative to the peace of Austria.

Sir Edward Grey Quoted

The aggressiveness of Servia toward her neighbors was condemned, shortly before the outbreak of the present crisis, by Sir Edward Grey, who said in a conversation with a foreign statesman:

"Servia is a perpetual danger to European peace; its groundless aspirations continually threaten the tranquillity of the world. The present dynasty must have external success to remain in power."

On the eve of the crisis the British ambassador in Vienna, Sir M. de Bunsen, observed to the editor of the *Freie Presse* "that the entire English nation condemns the crime of Sarajevo. No single Englishman has any sympathy left for Servia. We are thoroughly weary of being thrown into disquietude by this little country, and there is no Englishman who does not wish heartily that Servia receive a rough, sound lesson."

The Demands of Austria-Hungary

The Government of Emperor Francis Joseph followed this advice and demanded from Servia a discontinuance of her intrigues and her violent attacks upon the integrity of the dual Monarchy. It asked for the co-operation of the Austrian and Servian police with a view to the detection and punishment of the moral authors of the dastardly crime of Sarajevo; but it never made an attempt to establish Austrian control over Servian law courts, as has been represented by the Servian press and reiterated by the Anglo-French chorus.

It is equally untrue that the Servian Government accepted almost all the conditions of the Austrian ultimatum. A misleading presentation of the case was given out by Premier Pashitch to the whole world, and was published in good faith by the American press. Servia's acceptance of almost every point was conditional and amounted to a veiled refusal. Nothing was left to the dual Monarchy but to declare war upon Servia, who, under the influence of regicidal officers, had resorted to assassination as a political method. This drastic step Austria undertook, in spite of the danger that was looming up in the North.

The Championship of Russia

Indeed, Russia, which had quietly looked on in 1913 when Bulgaria, another Slavic nation, was being attacked simul-

taneously by four countries, at once announced her championship of Servia, the deadly foe of the dual Monarchy, on the ground that the Czar could not look on with indifference while a Slavic nation was being menaced, as it was explained in St. Petersburg. Czar Nicholas had ordered the mobilization while negotiations were going on in St. Petersburg. In spite of Austria's promise to Russia to respect the territorial integrity of Servia—a fact admitted in the House of Commons by Sir Edward Grey—Emperor Nicholas forced the conflict upon Kaiser Wilhelm by refusing to stop the mobilization on the German frontier.

The Franco-Russian alliance automatically brought France into the field. One of the greatest tragedies in history was enacted when the French nation, governed by a half-socialistic and half-radical cabinet, profoundly pacific in its tendencies, found itself involved in a conflict which originated in the outrageous conspiracy of Belgrade. The inability of Frenchmen to reconcile themselves to the loss of Alsace, a German province snatched from Germany in a time of complete peace by Louis XIV., made them subservient to the vast ambitious schemes of the northern semi-Asiatic Empire.

Action of British Cabinet

Unlike France, Great Britain had no treaty engagement to assist Russia in the war now raging in Europe; but the fact that the military and naval authorities of Great Britain and France had come to an agreement on the distribution of their respective fleets in the event of a conflict left no choice to the Cabinet of St. James but to side with France. Sir Edward Grey declared in the most solemn manner in the House of Commons that Parliament was free to determine Great Britain's course. Then, almost in the same breath, he asked the question: "Are we not in honor bound to defend the French coasts of the North Sea against an attack by the German fleet, having advised the French Government to send all its battleships to the Mediterranean?" Did not Sir Edward, by putting this question, involuntarily admit that Great Britain was no longer free, and that the military and naval arrangements made had prejudiced the political future?

Germany was compelled by strategic necessity to advance reluctantly through Belgian territory. But she offered a solemn pledge to respect the integrity of Belgium and to compensate

the Kingdom for all damages. The violation of Belgium's neutrality gave Great Britain a convenient and highly moral pretext to declare herself against Germany. No doubt the Liberal British Government, and, above all, its Secretary for Foreign Affairs, had done their best to maintain peace, and were loath to enter into the world's greatest conflict.

A Dangerous Trade Rival

On the other hand, the opportunity to deal a deadly blow at the dangerous trade rival whose gigantic strides toward the commercial conquest of the world menaced British supremacy was too tempting. At the same time hopes were entertained in London that it would be possible to destroy the powerful German fleet which seemed a menace to the security of even the British Isles. These were the real motives that impelled Great Britain to join Russia and France.

The fear of Germany's commercial expansion was so great that Britain had drawn close to her traditional enemy in Asia, and even had meekly tolerated Russia's encroachments upon Persia. The pretext, given by Sir Edward Grey, of Great Britain's sacred obligation to protect the menaced neutrality of Belgium, led to a sad result. Little Belgium believed that she could rely upon the active protection of France and England. In reality, she was used as a shield behind which the Allies achieved the occupation of their strategical lines. Belgium was sacrificed without compunction, and then comforted with high-sounding phrases of admiration for her heroism.

The Policy of Russia

All these tragic events came in the wake of Russia's schemes of Pan-Slavic expansion. Russia's policy to incite disaffection among all Slavs in the Austro-Hungarian Empire and her use of Servia and Montenegro as advanced posts against the position of Austria-Hungary in Bosnia and Herzegovina were bound to bring about the clash with the dual Monarchy.

Germany's aim is to preserve the integrity of Asiatic Turkey, to build railroads in that region, and to colonize reclaimed lands. Russia, on the other hand, is bent upon the opening of the Straits of Constantinople and the breaking up of Asiatic Turkey, which she menaces more and more from her new point of strategy in northern Persia, now fallen entirely under Russian control. This clash of interests caused a prominent Russian historian to

state, "The way to Constantinople lies through Berlin as well as through Vienna."

Russia's Increasing Armaments

Russia's schemes of expansion were backed by ever-increasing armaments, which lately were pushed with such vigor and at such appalling expense that a crisis began to seem imminent. The expenditure of French billions had enabled Russia to undertake this aggressive militarist policy.

When, on the other hand, France returned to the three-year term of service in order to establish a peace strength of more than 800,000 men at a time when Germany, with a population of over 67,000,000, and exposed on two fronts, did not muster a stronger peace establishment, it became clear to most German minds that the long-dreaded conflict was drawing near. Hemmed between the aggressive Russian Empire and the vengeful French Republic, Germany had no choice but to hit hard and to do it first, hoping by its superior rapidity of mobilization to crush the western foe before the Russian legions, held back in the south by Austria-Hungary, could swamp Eastern Germany.

Although Kaiser Wilhelm found himself compelled to declare war, he acted on the defensive. The real aggressor was Russia.

THE MENACE OF THE GREAT BEAR

Russia and the Ruthenians—A Phase of Pan-Slavism

By A RUTHENIAN

It is safe to assume that most of our readers are unaware that the Ruthenians, or Small-Russians as the Russians christened them, or Ukrainians as they style themselves, are a people numbering thirty-five millions. The western world hardly suspected the existence of this nation, which ranks second among the Slav; the Ruthenians have lately been moved to a more prominent place in European politics, their future destiny being one of the main causes of the present war.

Of the thirty-five millions of Ruthenians, more properly called Ukrainians, about four millions live in Eastern Galicia and half a million in Upper Hungary, whereas more than thirty millions are at home in Southern Russia, in the fertile plains stretching from both banks of the Dnieper to the Don and the Black Sea.

As far back as the tenth century Ukraina was a mighty country, and its capital, Kiev, then was the largest, wealthiest, and the most advanced city in Eastern Europe. In those days, Western Europe fully realized the Ukrainian rulers' power, foreign rulers sought their friendship, Prince Volodymir Monomach was married to Gytha, the daughter of Harold, the Saxon King of England, and his daughter, Anne, became Queen of France. After the destruction of their flourishing country by the invading Tartars, the Ukrainians came under Lithuanian, then Polish, and finally Russian domination.

Russia was quick to realize that, were the national civilization of such a large population occupying the most fertile parts of the Empire allowed to subsist, this would ever be a source of danger for herself. It was, therefore, decided to denationalize the Ukrainians, and drastic, unscrupulous were the methods applied to this end. The very existence of the nation was denied, its language was summarily decreed to be the "small Russian dialect" and was prohibited in schools and official life. Not content with this, official Russia prohibited the printing of Ukrainian texts, even of prayer-books.

The total suppression of national existence, which threatened the Ukrainians was happily averted when a fraction of them came under Austrian rule as a consequence of Poland's partition. With the constitutional freedom granted by Austria, the Ukrainians in that country were enabled to maintain and develop their national existence and culture. Ukrainian schools and colleges were founded, beside many national clubs or associations for upholding the people's economic and ideal interests. Ukrainian was officially recognized as the country's language, and acts were passed in the provincial diet and parliament safeguarding Ukrainian rights. The people were inaugurating a national "renaissance," their culture and literature were once more going ahead, the Austrian Government, well appreciating the situation, had agreed last year to the establishment of an Ukrainian university in Lemberg.

Ukrainian Unrest

The national resurrection of the Ukrainians, though materially confined to Austria, had a moral effect far beyond the Russian borders. Comparing their lot with that of their happier fellow countrymen in Austria, the Ukrainians in Russia gave signs of

unrest, and Russia had to realize that her yoke was unbearable to the people who looked to Galicia as to their "Piemonte."

The Ukrainian aspirations were not passed unnoticed by the watchful Russian officials, who quickly perceived that a new threat was arising to their Government's despotism; nationally enlightened Ukrainians would not willingly submit to Russian oppressive rule and would even attempt to free themselves.

Official Russia then declared that the annexation of Galicia was the safest course to take in order to offset the threatening danger. When this would be achieved, the time-honored Russian "à la Cosaque" methods would nip in the bud the resurrecting Ukrainian culture. These official Russian views were disseminated in periodicals and at public meetings. As long as a powerful Austria stood in the way, such theories could be advanced in speech and print, but they could not be put into practice. Since annexation by violence was not possible, one had to resort to other means.

The Ukrainian "renaissance" was declared by official Russia to be but a malicious invention of the Austrian Government, nay, the very existence of Ukrainians in Galicia was flatly denied, and the Ukrainians were described by St. Petersburg as Russians, brothers who were subjected to utterly intolerable religious and national oppression! The St. Petersburg Government gave its financial support to the recently launched "Russian-Galician Society" and "Slav Benevolent Society," both inspired by Count Bobrinski with the sole object of promoting Russian political agitation in Galicia. In this campaign, which started both on educational and religious lines, the chief Russian weapon was—the Rouble.

At first, Galicia was actually flooded by Russian emissaries; these "agents provocateurs" were entrusted with the "disaffection mission" of the poorer class of peasants who were to be promised a free hand in the partition of the dominial estates and the robbing of the Jews, once the Czar would have conquered the country. Numbers of these poor peasants' children were taken to Russia, there to be educated in convents to be fit agitators for the Russian Orthodox Church (the Ukrainians in Galicia are members of the Roman Catholic Church, though they have retained Greek rites); once their education completed, the "students" were sent back to Galicia with sufficient funds and with orders to agitate and also to act as military spies, as

the prosecutions in Munkacs and Lemberg have amply disclosed.

Undermining Austria in Galicia

Free boarding schools for poor peasants' sons were founded with Russian funds, the educational work being carried on in accordance with Russian aims. Galicia was flooded with Russian anti-Austrian literature, the prayer-books containing prayers for the Czar, and the Russian benefactors gave all these good things free, without wanting anything in return! Even certain English newspapers were influenced so far as to publish accounts of "the unparalleled oppression of the Russians in Galicia," the authors being Bobrinski and also J. W. Birkbeck, an Englishman acting as Russia's agent for England. Bobrinski did not shrink from going to Galicia and there to speak in terms which should, had the Austrian authorities concerned not been too lenient for peace' sake, have led him to detention for political crimes. Attempts were also made to persuade the Austrian Government, through diplomatic channels, that peace with Russia could be maintained only if the Russian agitation in Galicia were tolerated; at the very time St. Petersburg's bureaucrats declared Galicia would soon be ripe for picking.

Inasmuch as public opinion exists in Russia, it was carefully prepared and familiarized with the idea that war with Austria is unavoidable, and that Galicia must be annexed. This policy was succinctly expressed by Bobrinski's characteristic exclamation, "We shall not rest ere the Russian flag flies on the Carpathians!" To bring war about, and at the same time to conceal her aggressive policy, Russia started the anti-Austrian campaign in Servia. The unsuspecting reader might fancy that Russia's attitude in backing Servia is the outcome of a sincere feeling of Slav solidarity, but the initiated knew perfectly well that Russia could reach Lemberg best by way of Belgrade.

Let us finally consider the Ukrainians' attitude when this war started. From the very first minute it was well defined and unanimously supported, "We shall fight for freedom and Austria." Immediately hostilities began, numerous Ukrainian volunteer companies took the field against Russia, their archbishop in Lemberg, Count Szeptycki, having devoted his entire fortune to this purpose. The archbishop has already been made prisoner and sent to Russia, where he will have to answer for his unswerving patriotism.

Count Szeptycki will be one of the many noble victims of a just cause; the Ukrainians will hold their memory in high esteem and honor. It is to be anticipated that the hopes of this enduring and cultured nation will be fulfilled at an early date. Western civilization would fare all the better by it.

WE POLES IN AUSTRIA

By EUGENE ROZWADOWSKI

He who enters the wonderful edifice on the Franzensring in Vienna, the home of the Austrian Parliament, will find the statues of the greatest Austrian Parliamentarians in the magnificent pillared central hall. Altogether there are but a dozen marble busts there, among them four of Poles—Grocholski, Dunajewski, Jaworski, and, in the place of honor just at the right of the main entrance, the bust of Franz Smolka.

The latter embodies in a measure the relation of the Poles to the Empire. Smolka, who as a revolutionist was sentenced to death in 1848 and owed his life to Imperial clemency, became later one of the creators of Austrian Parliamentarism, and, subsequently, for more than fifteen years, was President of the Parliament (Speaker). The development of the Polish people in Austria resembles Smolka's career. Still openly revolting in 1848, they co-ordinated themselves ever since the beginning of constitutional life to the idea of the Austrian State and attained a leading rôle in Austrian state affairs by absolute loyalty to the Emperor and by a wise policy in Parliament.

The Poles for Austria

The principle of the Poles always to vote for the so-called state necessities, *i.e.*, the budget and the Government's appropriations for Army and Navy, no matter whether the "Pole Club" of the Parliament agreed on other questions with the majority or the opposition, has always been considered the key-stone of their Parliamentary policy. Even though this attitude in Parliamentary disputes frequently takes a trump out of their hands, they invariably adhere to it, well recognizing the necessity of a strong Austria as the only and best warranty for

the freedom and development of all Austrian peoples. In the old Parliament (before the introduction of equal and universal suffrage in 1907), when the landed nobility were the leaders of the Pole Club, its attitude toward the Government was frequently characterized as being not only in the interest of the Empire but also of the nobility itself which thereby secured—as Government party—the domination of Galicia. In view of this, there was a curious expectancy as to what the attitude of the Pole Club would be after the new Parliament was elected by universal and equal suffrage. By the new democratic franchise, the predominance and power of the nobility in the Pole Club were practically destroyed, and a majority of radical nationalist Pan-Poles was formed. However, the policy toward the Government remained unchanged. The nationalist Poles forming the new Pole Club strictly adhered to the practice of their predecessors to strengthen the prestige of the Austrian Government within and without the Empire, and invariably supported each Cabinet whether they were in harmony with it or not. In the subsequent election the radical Polish peasant party was victorious, but even then the Parliamentary policy of the Poles remained the same as before.

This serves to show the unwavering loyalty of all political and social parties of the Poles to the Government, and particularly to the reigning dynasty. In fact, in none of his domains is Emperor Franz Josef more popular than in Galicia. The Polish people always preserve for him a feeling of gratitude in return for the granted national freedom which is ascribed to a great extent to his personal influence.

As a matter of fact, the national development of the Poles in Austria is quite considerable. They enjoy a far-reaching autonomy, have national schools, including two universities, which are the Mecca of erudition for the whole nation, also for the Poles of Russia and Prussia, where there are no such national educational institutions. They have also an Academy of Science in Cracow, and their own Polish judicature and administration.

For several years, Galicia's economic progress has been important, though it naturally suffered when Russia caused the crises of 1908 and 1912. The formation and prosperity of economic unions (industrial, savings, agricultural, and consumers' associations) have developed to a remarkable degree, and in this respect Galicia outranks all other countries of the Empire.

80,000 Drilled Poles

The Poles, within and without Austria, base the future of their nation upon the governing policy of the Hapsburg dynasty, and this confidence in the reigning House found an expression when ten years ago the Galician Diet unanimously resolved to offer to the Emperor the ancient royal palace in Cracow for his residence, voting several million kronen for this purpose. In accepting this gift of the Polish people, the Emperor stipulated that a portion of the palace be used as a Polish National Museum, which deeply impressed this temperamental people.

It is truly impossible to imagine better relations between the people and their ruler than those existing between Emperor Franz Josef and the Poles, relations which were "never darkened by any cloud," as the Emperor remarked when he received a deputation in Jaslo on occasion of his visit to Galicia in 1902; he also added that the Poles should devote themselves more to the military profession, as the Polish soldier and officer were the most secure support of the Empire. For several years, the Poles have actually shown a remarkable activity as regards various voluntary military organizations. There are not fewer than 80,000 members enrolled in same, who regularly take part in well-disciplined drill and rifle practice. Last year they even went through a period of manœuvres near Lemberg in which about 8,000 men took part.

When the war against Russia broke out, a great number of these voluntary companies equipped themselves under the command of former active army officers. By the Imperial decree of August 1, they were incorporated in the "Landsturm" (Third Reserve), went to the front, and right at the beginning of hostilities annihilated a body of Cossacks near Tarnopol. They were first in entering Russia in Miechow, after dislodging a Russian detachment there.

Owing to the lack of unbiased news from the Galician theatre of war, nothing definite has become known here as yet of these brave men; but the fact that Grand Duke Nicolay Nicolajewitch, with utter disregard of international law, has decreed that the Polish Rifles and "Sokol" organizations should not be made prisoners of war, but should be summarily shot, serves to show that their presence on the battlefield has made itself felt by the Russians.

AUSTRIA-HUNGARY AND THE WAR

Comprehensive Historical Sketch of the Intrigues of Russia and Her Allies Preceding the Great Conflict

Address delivered by

DR. FRITZ FISCHERAUER

Vice-Consul of Austria-Hungary, November 4, 1914, at the German Social-Scientific Club of New York

A terrible and exceptionally sanguinary war devastates the Old World. Europe is not alone the arena of the mighty struggle, for Asiatic peoples have also been drawn into it by England, and have brought warfare according to their own fashion into sorely tried Europe bleeding from a thousand wounds, and are thus infinitely enhancing the atrocities of the war. It is no longer a secret to any one, and is not denied by careful observers, that Russia is guilty in the first place, if not exclusively, of the awful carnage, that the responsibility for the destruction of so many young lives, the pride and hope of all nations, and for the devastation of the nations' wealth accumulated after many years of hard labor, rests upon those Russian statesmen who, with a singular talent for intrigue, steeped since years in instigation and baiting, have caused the present wholesale slaughter in Europe.

"This Is My War"

One of them only recently, with head erect, proclaimed to the world, "*This is my war*," and thus perhaps unwittingly refuted the attempt made at Petrograd to ascribe this greatest of all wars to the provocation of the two central European Powers. These Powers had nothing to gain by war; time was working for them. For Austria-Hungary gradually more and more responded to the national desires of her various races, thus removing the pretended cause of the Russian and Servian intrigue carried on within the dual Monarchy. Had peace been maintained the indefatigable industry of Germany's manufacturers and merchants could not have failed to secure her supremacy over her English competitors.

The development of the German Navy would also have made

such progress that a conflict on the seas with the English foe would hardly have been contemplated without terror.

However, as stated before, it was a Russian statesman who dispelled all doubt as to who brought about and desired this war, having proudly and with innate presumption described the present European war as the result of his own doing. *This statesman is* ISWOLSKI.

The history of his country in the last few years is most closely connected with his name, and this fact enhances the weight of the said declaration. It throws a bright light upon the situation, and will also serve as a welcome guide upon the perplexing paths of European politics, to those who live far from the Old World and who are therefore unable to follow Iswolski's activities in all their details. The fact that during his ministerial incumbency he did not exactly acquit himself with glory, and, moreover, succumbed in his diplomatic encounter with Count Aehrenthal during the crisis of the Bosnian annexation, surely does not affect the importance of Iswolski's rejoicings, uttered with so much emphasis over the result of his many years' efforts at last attained. Notwithstanding his not inconsiderable defeats of those days, the middle class, and even the very highest Russian circles always lent him a willing ear, and though he was later compelled to exchange his ministerial post for that of Russian Ambassador at Paris, this was not so much due to his diplomatic mistakes as the consequences of a delicate regard for a troubled purse. However, I should not like to dwell any longer upon this question and will limit myself to the statement that both Austria-Hungary and Germany will, thanks to his frankness, forever remember Iswolski, notwithstanding the evil experiences they had with him. For has he not practised with the simplicity of a child what the brains of the knowing would not accomplish in the German White Book: "He has nailed down the fact beyond all doubt that the war was desired and provoked by Russia."

The Royal Politician's Hand

In order to be able to judge somewhat correctly the European situation, it is necessary to make some digression. One must hark back to the time when, upon the occasion of the crowning of King Edward VII. of England, the politics of the insular Empire were turned in a new direction. The royal politician considered it in the interest of his country, partly on personal and partly

on sufficiently well-known political and economical grounds, to modify the friendly attitude toward the Triple Alliance until then assumed by the English statesmen, and to more and more approach the Dual Entente. An understanding entered into with France was followed by one with Russia; a number of political interviews with the crowned Germanophobe increased in an uncomfortable manner; in the attempt to take Spain in the van of the Western Powers, Italy was ensnared and Austria-Hungary showered with tokens of love and friendship. Each year Edward appeared in the Imperial summer resort at Ischl in order there to assure the dean of European sovereigns in fervent words of his unfaltering friendship.

The sympathies for the English were great in those days in the dual Monarchy, and the value of the political friendship with the United Kingdom was also highly appreciated in their leading circles. This friendship, of course, had its natural limitations, however. It was naturally never meant to serve as a springboard for the attempts to isolate Germany. Yet those at the helm of England's foreign policy regarded it in this sense. And when they learned that an understanding of Austria-Hungary with the insular Empire would naturally have to end where it would point against Germany, the formerly so warm English sentiments for Vienna suddenly became cold.

This was in the year of 1907. In the summer of this year, King Edward left the Imperial residence at Ischl, filled with anger. Soon we were made to feel London's disaffection in a remarkable manner. First in the joint intervention of the great Powers, then set afoot in Macedonia, in which England suddenly arraigned herself on the side of Russia and fully supported the most extravagant claims of the Czar, which were wholly unacceptable to the Turks.

The Sanjak Railway

But the scorn of the English over the faith of Austria-Hungary to her ally broke out with almost elemental force, when in January, 1908, Count Aehrenthal obtained from the Turks the concession for the construction of the Sanjak railway. The attacks of the English press vied in their violence and rudeness with those of their Pan-Slav colleagues at Petrograd and Moscow, to say nothing of the French press, which, like French diplomacy, had for years been accustomed to obey blindly all orders coming

from St. Petersburg and to turn back at every sign of the Russian ally even as a subaltern. The war of the press waged for months. Austria-Hungary was to be intimidated and to yield to the dictates of the Russian policy, supported by England. The figures failed. Austria-Hungary was not inclined to admit that, by her said action, she had violated the understanding reached with Russia in 1903, which had established the *status quo* in the Balkans. This understanding was of a political nature, had nothing to do with economic questions, and could, of course, not obstruct either of the contracting parties in the protection of her economic interests in the Balkans.

At that time already there was in the air something of Russia's political efforts to exclude Austria-Hungary from the Balkans, and to make the Balkans appear as Russia's exclusive sphere of interest. The convention of Murz-Steg,—or rather the program there agreed upon between Austria-Hungary and Russia in 1903 dealing with the reform of European Turkey—was only a temporary deviation from the direction of the Russian policy influenced by Pan-Slav tendencies. The ultimate aim of those Pan-Slav tendencies was to make use of the peoples of the Balkans in favor of Russia's ambitions of expansion, and thus to create a battering-ram against a powerful Austria-Hungary, the greatest obstacle on Russia's path to Constantinople. This could most effectively be carried out by appealing to the Slav national feeling by promising a Slav unification, which would have led to a strong Slav coalition. Murz-Steg, therefore, constituted only a pause in the furtherance of Russian territorial lust; and was intended to cover the rear of the Czar's Empire during the impending settling of accounts with Japan, and to prevent surprises in the Balkans at a time when all its forces were engaged against the yellow race in the Far East.

Iswolski's Treachery

This aim was actually reached. Austria-Hungary, which has ever labored for the free development of the Balkan peoples, conscientiously fulfilled the obligations assumed by her at Murz-Steg and proceeded in her correct attitude to such a degree that it was possible for Russia during her war with Japan to entirely denude her western frontier. It is certainly not Austria-Hungary's fault, if Russia, nevertheless, did not succeed in winning glory for her arms in that war. The reasons, therefore, must

be sought in conditions which are pretty generally known, and whose discussion would lead us far beyond the limitations of the subject at hand. Let us here, therefore, only assert that the Russian Foreign Minister Iswolski, after the Russian defeats in Manchuria, and the total annihilation of the Russian fleet off Tshushima, had secured peace with Japan for some time to come, grasped the first opportunity offered to declare the Murz-Steg understanding null and void. He thus freed himself of the fetters assumed only under the pressure of the Japanese danger, and obtained an absolutely free hand in the Balkans against Austria-Hungary. The occasion for this was the aforementioned Austrian concession obtained from Turkey for the construction of the Sanjak railway, which with hair-splitting arguments was declared a violation of the *status quo*. On this ground England and Russia subsequently indulged in revelries of "political decency," a virtue which, as well known, is monopolized by these countries.

Having obtained a free hand, Iswolski thereby had advanced a step nearer to his fervent aim of combating the dual Monarchy. His predecessor's policy of friendly *rapprochement* with Austria-Hungary was thrown to the winds, and Russia, now under the influence of this ominous man, proceeded upon the path which ultimately was bound to lead to the present horrible holocaust. The disastrous defeats in Manchuria, and the Russian pride thereby wounded to the quick, incited the morbidly vainglorious minister to obtain in Europe the military laurels which had been denied the Czar's Empire in the Far East.

Going into Secret History

Henceforth, Russia was no longer bound to observe any obligations whatever, with respect to Austria-Hungary, and could give free rein to her intense hatred. She did this in the fullest possible measure. Of course, not with the great success which the Russian Foreign Minister, so richly gifted with a limitless amount of imagination, had pictured to himself. For Austria-Hungary now, of course, also had a free hand in the Balkans, and did not fail to make good use of it.

In October, 1908, the sovereignty of Emperor Francis Joseph was extended over Bosnia and Herzegovina. Previous thereto, in the month of September, Count Aehrenthal had a conference with Iswolski at Castle Buchlau in Moravia. The latter was

informed of the intended annexation of the two provinces and declared himself agreeable. As a compensation, he obtained the consent of Austria-Hungary to the opening of the Straits of Constantinople.

Whether Iswolski intended from the very outset to break his word, or merely in his unique lust for successes wanted to bring back from his European tour to St. Petersburg the consent of the signatory Powers to the solution of the Dardanelles question in the Russian sense, and in doing so forgot his hatred against Austria-Hungary for a moment, is of no consequence at this time. Anyway, the oft-mentioned gentleman journeyed from Buchlau to France.

There he was not the object of a particularly hearty reception. He even had to suffer bitter censure. He was blamed for discussing questions of a general European character with a member of the Triple Alliance and making promises to him, without previous consultation with his French ally. Iswolski was perplexed to the extreme; he, however, was wholly nonplussed when on his arrival in London he there, too, was snubbed and given a strictly negative answer by the St. James Cabinet in the Straits question.

England Declined—Iswolski Disappointed

For the cancellation of the closing of the Straits, it was of course necessary to obtain the consent of all European signatory Powers, and that of England was refused the proud Pan-Slav minister. To aggravate matters, he had made far-reaching promises to Austria-Hungary with respect to Bosnia and Herzegovina in the anticipation of the early opening of the Dardanelles for Russian men-of-war!

His rage knew no bounds. Meanwhile, October had come, and the annexation of Bosnia became an accomplished fact.

Evil days were in store for poor Iswolski at St. Petersburg, whither he was now to return. After having left with the most promising expectations, he returned home a failure. He did not have the courage to stand by the fulfilment of his word, given at Buchlau, and it was much more in harmony with his natural inclination to turn with all the means at his disposal against the hated Austria-Hungary which stood in the way of his Balkan plans.

The awful baiting which was then set afoot by him against

Austria-Hungary, with the indefatigable support of England, and, of course, also of France, is still remembered by all. The "sacredness of treaties" was proclaimed in all keys against Foreign Minister Aehrenthal, and there was talk of the ravishing of Servian provinces, which had already in 1878, at the Congress at Berlin, been turned over to be administered by Austria for all time with the consent of the whole of Europe, and thus also of Russia and England.

The easily aroused Servian passions were thus incited in an irresponsible way; their claim to the Servian provinces of Austria-Hungary were declared just in every respect, and their efforts toward realizing the same were promised full support by the Entente. The Serbs already saw themselves masters of the situation; their agitation assumed dangerous proportions, and their attitude toward the Monarchy became more and more provoking.

In this awful turbulence, and during this unexampled agitation, the block of the two European States stood firmly united like a rock in the midst of surging waves. Avoiding all provocation, they made it plain to their opponents that there could be no discussion as to a retreat on their part. All attempts at intimidation failed. But, forsooth, the Servian brains wholly ceased to perform their functions. Relying with certainty upon Russian aid, the Serbs launched such attacks against Austria-Hungary that the latter was compelled to decree mobilization. And then the Russian aid, which had been so fervently hoped for by Servia, and actually promised by Russian diplomats, failed to materialize. With one of those theatrical tricks in the handling of which Iswolski is such a master, he suddenly gave up the struggle against the annexation of Bosnia, and explained this to the somewhat astonished Russian public by declaring the German Ambassador had threatened war in the event of further difficulties being laid in the way of the annexation.

As a matter of fact, the German Ambassador only said that an Austro-Servian war would be unavoidable if the Servian agitation were not stopped. And it is also a fact that Russia at that time was not only unable to offer resistance to the united German and Austrian arms, but that as a result of the Japanese war, she was still bleeding from a thousand wounds and could not have had a war at all.

The Campaign of Agitation

She, therefore, only wanted to intimidate Austria-Hungary by the inauguration of a general European campaign of indignation and by inciting the Serbs and Montenegrins. She hoped to be able to force the revocation of a measure the only purpose of which it was, as is well known, formally to accentuate an actual condition existing since the year of 1878, that is, for thirty years. This condition had been brought about with the consent of the whole of Europe, and conferred the blessings of a constitutional life upon the two provinces thus far under military administration.

Iswolski's diplomatic intrigue thus ended in a complete failure, and has since been referred to by a prominent Russian politician as a "diplomatic Tshushima." Austria-Hungary, however, on this occasion again gave striking proof of her great love of peace. Although it was in her power to crush Servia, which had at first been stirred up by Russia with all her Pan-Slav art, and then in the decisive moment was left in the lurch, the Monarchy contented herself with a declaration of the Servian Government whereby the latter recognized the annexation of Bosnia, and promised to refrain forever from agitating in the southern Slavic provinces of Austria-Hungary.

The Austro-Hungarian Government pursued this course despite violent opposition of the public opinion of the country; but she wanted to give further proof that the lust for territorial expansion ascribed to her by politicians of the Entente was far from her thoughts, and that she was guided by only one object, to have order within the borders of the Monarchy and to secure her people the blessings of peace.

It depended only upon St. Petersburg whether the Serbs would keep their solemn promise or would continue to indulge further in the most insolent agitation in the Monarchy's southern parts. For it hardly requires special mention that Servia, which, compared to Austria-Hungary, is, in a military, political, and economical sense, so very much inferior, would not have permitted herself to provoke us, particularly after the bitter experience of the crisis incident to Bosnia's annexation, had she not been specially encouraged to do so by Russia.

The Plot Develops

The year of 1908 already gave us a foretaste of the further development of this question, which has now given occasion to

the greatest and bloodiest war of the world. It was on December 25, 1908, when Iswolski grasped the opportunity to lay before the Duma the plans of the Russian foreign policy. As early as that he already spoke of the necessity of a Balkan alliance, of the federation, particularly, of the Slavish Balkan States for protection against a further expansion of Austria-Hungary toward the southeast, whereby the political equilibrium of Europe would be upset according to the Russian conception. In the hubbub of the diplomatic and publicist struggle then being carried on about the Bosnian question, this question, at least in public, was paid little attention.

It, however, soon proved to be of great importance, and the Russian policy, notwithstanding the recent diplomatic defeats, still continued to be imbued with the sole thought: to make new enemies for Austria-Hungary, in order to increase the military might of the Entente by enlisting new friends who could gain territory by the Monarchy's collapse. In other words, if possible, to form a Balkan block with its face against Austria-Hungary, the encircling of the Monarchy was thereby almost accomplished. It was only necessary to win over Italy and Rumania, and then it was possible, according to the hopes cherished in St. Petersburg, safely to deal a death-blow to the ancient, venerable Empire on the Danube. This completed, there stood nothing more in the way of the boundless and almost pathologic lust for expansion of the Muscovite. The small States which would have to be set up would naturally be unable to offer resistance to Russia, and even strong Germany, standing alone and surrounded on all sides by enemies, could no longer have halted the Pan-Slav impulse for expansion.

The Pan-Slavs industriously labored in the sense of Iswolski's speech of December 25, 1908. It is true the latter had to leave his ministerial post in April, 1909, and to proceed as Ambassador to Paris, where he successfully influenced the French press, which is so very servile to Russia.

Sasanow Continues the Plot

His successor at St. Petersburg was Sasanow, who, though employing other means and using other methods, was in the main led by the same ideas. He, too, considered his foremost task the destruction of Austria-Hungary, upon the ruins of which the Russian world-empire should be erected. The idea of

the Balkan Slav alliance was, therefore, naturally also most laboriously supported by Sasanow. All means were employed to bring about this alliance, which in the event of a war against the central Powers would secure to Russia, according to her figures, an auxiliary force of 700,000 to 800,000 men. It would lead too far if I should wish to cover the details of this diplomatic campaign of Russia. I shall, therefore, content myself with stating that after protracted efforts a Serbo-Bulgarian alliance was at last successfully brought about on February 29, 1912. It received the official title of a defensive alliance. The two Slavic Balkan States were to succor each other in the event of an attack from a third party.

The alliance was primarily directed against Austria-Hungary, and was in the course of 1912 supplemented by various additions. It contains among other things the well-known provision that in the event of an attack from Austria-Hungary upon Servia, Bulgaria be compelled to furnish the latter an army of 200,000 men.

Russia's relation to this alliance is clearly defined by the statement of a Russian diplomat, made in July, 1912, that Russia is proud that this alliance was brought about upon Russia's initiation and under her patronage. The almost too bold hopes that were attached to this alliance were, however, not to be realized.

Austria-Hungary, fully aware of the danger which the success of the Russian plan would mean to the Monarchy, was on her guard, and undertook all diplomatic means to break through the net of intrigue spun against her. In this instance, too, she held fast to the basic principle of her policy of opposing by diplomatic, that is, peaceable means, the ever-recurring Balkan crises, though there was then as little lack of Russian and Servian provocation as at the time of the annexation crisis.

Forming the Balkan Alliance

As is well known, the Balkan alliance was brought about at a time when Turkey was at war with Italy on the occasion of the occupation of Tripoli by Italian troops. Turkey's dignity suffered fresh wounds by the impending loss of another province, with the result that the plot arranged by the Russians with the Slavic alliance did not adhere exactly to the march route prescribed for it by its mighty northern protector.

The land-hungry middle Balkan States soon joined the Serbo-Bulgarian alliance. Not only the firebrand Montenegro, the army of which is supported by Russia; Greece, too, became a member of the Balkan alliance. This non-Slavic country did not want to let an opportunity slip by, either, to participate with the other Balkan peoples in the driving out of Turkey from Europe and to increase her territory at the expense of the Ottoman Empire. The edge of the Balkan alliance was directed, contrary to the original desire of its Russian creator, more and more against Turkey.

At the fall of 1912, the Balkan War broke out, the most important occurrences and results of which are well known to all. Turkey lost the greater part of her European possessions; all Balkan States received considerable increase in territory; but the Balkan alliance, brought about with so much effort on the part of Russia, also lay dead on the blood-soaked battle-field. The allied Servians and Bulgarians, who had been victorious against Turkey, turned, in the summer of 1913, their arms against each other, and, due to Russia's support, Servia triumphed over Bulgaria, which was much superior in military efficiency.

Russia's attitude during the entire war was very characteristic of the aim which she has not lost sight of for a moment since the defeats in Manchuria, and which, it cannot be mentioned often and emphatically enough, consisted in the main of mitigating the discomfiture suffered in the Far East by overriding Austria-Hungary, by successes in the Balkans, and opening of the road to Constantinople. St. Petersburg this time did not want to repeat the mistake made against Japan, which consisted of her precipitating a daring war-adventure unprepared. Immense sums of money, readily placed at her disposal by her French ally, were now spent year after year for military purposes; the number of recruits was increased; war stores of all sorts were provided in a manner hitherto unknown in Russia; Pan-Slav agitators, who furnished Russia's so-called public opinion in connection with the immense war preparations secretly made by the Russian Government, were again received with good grace.

Renewed Russian Machinations

And, not satisfied with the increase and feverish building up of her own forces, further allies in the Balkans were looked for.

Though the Balkan alliance, as already stated, proceeded against Turkey and not against Austria-Hungary, yet St. Petersburg hoped to render inseparable the bonds uniting the Balkan peoples by the blood shed in common struggles and to make the Balkan peoples allies of Russia and of the Triple Entente for all time. And during the entire Balkan War, Russia did not fail to offer the Balkan allies proofs of her sympathy and to make them understand that they could depend upon the most far-reaching support of the Russian Army not only against Turkey.

On the same day that war broke out by Montenegro's declaration of war upon Turkey, Russia mobilized 500,000 men on the Austrian border. The entire French and Pan-Slav press sang hymns of praise for the Balkan alliance, day after day, and as compensation for their heroism gave them prospects of territorial expansion at the expense of Austria-Hungary, whose destruction would follow that of Turkey.

In the first place, these alluring promises were, of course, meant for Servia and Montenegro. The howlings of joy in Russia, England, and France over the prospect that in the coming great war the brave Balkan warriors would struggle side by side with the armies of the Triple Entente were positively definite. The Austro-Hungarian Army would thereby be bound up against the Balkans to a great extent, and could only dispatch against Russia meagre forces, which would simply be swept away by the Czar's millions of men. And Germany could then not withstand the united English-Russian-French forces.

The howlings of the combined Russian and French press became worse and worse; the Pro-Slav meetings arranged in all the larger cities of Russia by Brobrinski and associates increased, and veritable orgies of joy were indulged in over the impending collapse of Austria-Hungary, upon whose ruling statesmen the meanest insults were heaped.

This anti-Austrian agitation was by no means restricted to the irresponsible politicians, instigated by the Russian Government; but Russian diplomats also stirred Servia and Montenegro to hatred against Austria-Hungary. In this Mr. Hartwig, the Russian Minister at Belgrade, excelled, in that he openly preached war against Austria-Hungary, whose Army he alleged was in a state of development, and thus unequal to a more important test of endurance. The sooner a blow was struck against Austria-Hungary the better. In view of this shameless

agitation even the blind began to see clearly, and the feeling that Russia was a deadly enemy gradually became the conviction with Austria-Hungary. Exasperation at the ceaseless Russian intrigues grew steadily.

Austria-Hungary Still Patient

Austria-Hungary was, of course, compelled to answer the Russian mobilization on the Austrian border by gathering a sufficient number of troops in Galicia, and measures of protection were also taken against Servia, whose officers already then expressed themselves most provokingly about the impending war against Austria-Hungary. But in her firm determination to persist to the uttermost limit of patience, and if at all possible to preserve the peace of Europe, the Austro-Hungarian Government did not permit itself to be disturbed even by these fresh provocations. It permitted the war occurrences in the Balkans to take their free course, and recognized, before all other great Powers, that the *status quo* in Turkey could not be withheld in view of the successes of the Balkan allies. But it wanted equal treatment of all Balkan peoples, and demanded that the Albanians should not be denied the enjoyment of a political autonomy, that the principle so loudly proclaimed by the waning States themselves, "The Balkans for the Balkan peoples," should not be modified to the detriment of the Albanians. This absolutely justified attitude of Austria-Hungary led up not only to protracted and weary diplomatic struggles, but also resulted in the end in the collapse of Serbo-Bulgarian friendship.

Servia having been prevented from extending her territory to the Albanian coast, now demanded from Bulgaria a modification of the jointly agreed-upon plan of dividing Macedonia, but promptly received a negative answer at Sophia. Both parties turned to St. Petersburg for protection. And the latter at first was greatly embarrassed. For the plan of dividing Macedonia between Servia and Bulgaria had been brought about with the co-operation of Russia and Bulgaria, which is less sympathetic to the Russians, and was altogether in her right when she asked from Servia the simple fulfilment of her treaty obligations. However, as is well known, such trifling scruples are pretty easily dismissed from one's mind in St. Petersburg.

The Second Balkan War

Russia, of course, did not bring about the Balkan alliance in the interest of Bulgaria, or the liberation of the Balkan Christians from the Turkish yoke, but exclusively in the interest of Russian lust for territorial expansion, into whose service the Balkan allies were to be impressed at the right moment. But for this the Serbs seemed to be more complacent than the Bulgarians, who have no co-nationals in Austria-Hungary, and for that reason have exhibited an inclination to maintain friendly relations with the dual Monarchy. According to Russian conception, however, this is a capital offense which must not go unpunished. Bulgaria, therefore, was directed to accede to Servia's wishes. Whenever Servia should at last incorporate the southern Slavish provinces of Austria-Hungary, she would return to Bulgaria those parts of Macedonia which are inhabited by Bulgarians.

Sophia, however, remained defiant. The Serbo-Bulgarian War broke out, and Russia did not shrink from inciting the Rumanians and Turks against Bulgaria in order to punish her for her disobedience. That the Greeks would join Servia was to be expected, as they had no understanding with Bulgaria regarding the future Græco-Bulgarian boundary-line, and, therefore, grasped with both hands the opportunity to be able to dictate her own terms also to Bulgaria, pressed from all sides. The encircling of Slavic Bulgaria, thus superintended by Russia, became a complete one. Thanks to the diplomatic and moral support of Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria was spared the worst, but it had to put up with a cession of territory to Rumania and the renunciation of the greatest part of Macedonia in favor of Servia. Russia showed once more how she protects her Slav brothers when they undertake to play their own and not Russian politics, or when they go so far as to refuse to look upon Austria-Hungary as their deadly enemy.

Russia had a treaty with Bulgaria which imposed the duty upon the former to protect her against the Rumanian invasion, but did not hesitate for a moment to incite against her this same Rumania against which she had entered into a treaty with Bulgaria when Sophia failed to obey orders.

Getting Ready for the War

But all this does not change the fact that, thanks to Austro-Hungarian diplomacy, the Balkan alliance lay on the ground,

wounded to death, and that but a part of the brave Balkan warriors, that is, the Servian army, remained at the disposal of the Triple Entente for the great war of the future. Now Russian politics set the machinery in motion in Belgrade in order to bring about the explosion for which St. Petersburg had been longing, all the more as Russia now felt prepared from a military point of view by offering efficient opposition to all emergencies. Hartwig, the Russian Minister at Belgrade, labored in this sense indefatigably, and the ever-increasing Greater Servian agitation in the southern provinces of Austria-Hungary was in the first place his work. Pasič, the Servian Prime Minister, in those days, appeared gaily with his bundle of papers before his Russian Excellency in order to report most humbly to him and receive his commands. Nothing was done thereafter without consulting Hartwig, and Belgrade was more and more reduced to the rôle of a Russian vassal.

At the same time the waves of national frenzy in Servia surged higher and higher, the Servian press assumed a more and more impertinent tone, and the agitation of the Servian societies knew no bounds. Hand in hand with this, there developed in Galicia a very extensive Russian system of espionage. There were times when for months twenty to thirty Russian spies were arrested in Galicia daily. The political atmosphere became ever closer, and Austria-Hungary's public opinion more and more stirred up.

Twice—in 1909 and 1913—Emperor Francis Joseph's unshakable love of peace succeeded in dispelling the danger of war. In 1909, when Austria-Hungary exercised far-reaching indulgence with respect to Servia, who was at that time left entirely to her tender mercies; and in 1913, when, by means of her wise and cautious diplomacy in dealing with the constant provocations, and her clever strategic moves, she successfully foiled the Russian intrigues. Calculating on the active support of England and France and relying upon the blind obedience of the Servian vassal, it was decided in St. Petersburg to employ extreme measures by which to offend Austria-Hungary's pride to such an extent as to render impossible every other kind of settlement, except by force of arms.

The Assassination

As you know, the assassination of Archduke Ferdinand was perpetrated on June 28th of this year at Sarajevo; you also know

that even before this occurrence the Russian army was mobilized. If there existed the least doubt about this, it was completely dispelled by *the statements of Russian soldiers who became Austrian prisoners of war, and confessed that they had been ready as early as May of this year.* It is no longer a secret that the perpetrators of the crime confessed during the judicial investigation at Sarajevo that they had been incited to the murder by Servian officers, that bombs and revolvers had been shipped to them from Servia, and that they had been instructed by Serbs in the use of these murderous weapons. I believe that I have also succeeded in proving, by my foregoing statements, that Belgrade is nothing but a Russian dependency, that the Servian Government officials do not undertake anything without the consent of the Russian Cabinet. All these facts, however, speak volumes, and shed such a glaring light upon the assassination at Sarajevo that further comment is hardly required.

The assassination of a prince of the House of Hapsburg found no condemnation in St. Petersburg; strictly monarchical Russia felt only sympathy for poor little Servia, whose sovereignty was menaced by the Austro-Hungarian demands for satisfaction. And Austria-Hungary was given to understand that Russia would not remain indifferent if her wishes with respect to the sparing of Servia should be disregarded. Expressed in plain language, this means that if Austria-Hungary should venture not to trust blindly to the Servian promises so often given and never kept, Russia would not hesitate to take drastic measures against her. To this only one answer could be expected, and the whole of Europe is now ablaze. Amid the wild yells of the gigantic war we hear Iswolski's boasting cry: This is my war!

If I spoke about Servia more than you perhaps desired, it was certainly not because I ascribed undue importance to this little country. Not by any means. I have referred to Servia only inasmuch as was necessary to explain the underhand services which she rendered to her Russian protector, who considered it beneath her dignity to perform such actions herself. Without knowledge and understanding of those services however, Russia's activities could not correctly be judged.

I still owe you the explanation, why the Russian Government and Russian public opinion, which naturally was under the Government's influence, desired this war. There are several reasons for this. As already stated, a strong Austria-Hungary interferes

with the Russian plan of expansion in the Near East. *But the hatred against the dual Monarchy is primarily due to the fact that the latter extends political freedom to all her nationalities, and in this respect would make no distinction as to the Ruthenians residing in Eastern Galicia.*

The Ruthenians

The majority of the Ruthenians, upward of thirty millions, reside, however, in Southern Russia. The fear that the freedom of their co-nationals in Austria might infect the Ruthenians of Russia, who, like all other nationalities, are being oppressed by the Czar's rule, and that an attempt of emancipation may in time endanger the idea of a United Greater Russian Empire has prompted Russia to act as she did. The greatest Slav Empire resents the fact that Austria-Hungary does not gag the Ruthenians, a Slav nation, according to Russian methods. Such is, in fact, the love of the Russians for their Slav brothers. *This makes it clear why those non-Russian Slavs who, like the Poles and Ruthenians, were unfortunate enough to get into close contact with the Russians, are possessed of an ineradicable hatred against them.*

Next to the Russian lust of expansion in the Near East, and to Petrograd's fear of a Ruthenian irredenta in Southern Russia, there is still another reason for the lack of love toward Austria-Hungary in the vast dominions of the Czar. Its fidelity to our ally, Germany, which, on account of her ever-increasing prosperity, is also a thorn in Russia's side. The strengthening of her position by a strong Austrian ally had the effect of pricking the nerves of the Russian men in power, whose desire it is to dominate Europe without hindrance from uncomfortable neighbors.

Aside of these concrete reasons, however, one must not disregard the general desire of territorial expansion of the Russians, if one wishes to judge their attitude before the present war commenced. This desire, ever since Russian history exists, has been distinguished by a most remarkable lack of moderation. Every Czar considered it his honorable duty to extend the limits of his Empire. To the present ruler of all the Russians this distinction had so far been denied; his war against Japan caused his country loss of territory and dignity.

Austria-Hungary and the Poles and Ruthenians

In the bloody war forced upon us we struggle not only for our existence, but also for the freedom of those nations which,

like Poles and Ruthenians, according to the plans of St. Petersburg, are to be brought under the Russian yoke. The awful truth of a portentous time meets at our gates, and in the world-historic war raging over Europe, Austria-Hungary struggles in the north as well as in the south against a numerically superior foe. But our troops fight with death-defying courage. Every member of the army, down to the last private, is possessed of the innermost feeling that he fights for a noble cause against a most hated enemy who does not shrink at any means to crush Austria-Hungary. The hatred produced by the Russian intrigues, which have been so zealously pursued during the last few years, matured the conviction in the humblest fighter that Russia is an inexorable and implacable enemy by whose discomfiture alone peace and calm could come to our Monarchy.

The issue of the struggle of the two central European Powers against the English-Russian-French-Belgian-Japanese-Servian-Montenegrin alliance is a secret of the future. But even the envious cannot deny recognition of the feats thus far accomplished by the two States that had been attacked from so many sides and by such a number of enemies.

Once before the two allied States stood all alone against all Europe. This was on the occasion of the Bosnian annexation crisis. At that time it amounted only to a diplomatic tussle, out of which Austria-Hungary and Germany, in spite of general ill will, came forth victorious. We are imbued with a firm conviction that in the present struggle, too, waged by the two Empires this time with fire and sword against an apparently more powerful alliance, final victory will be on the side of honor and truth.

THE JEWS AS AN ISSUE IN THE WAR

The vital interests of the Jewish race are involved in the great struggle which is now going on between Russia and the Germanic-Hungarian alliance on the Eastern battle-front of the nations, the borderland between Europe and Asia. Even the most superficial glance at the relative condition of the Jews in Russia and in Austria discloses differences which tell a graphic story of conflicting civilizations, of clashing racial ideals.

The Grand Duke Nicholas Nicholaievitch, commander-in-chief of the Russian forces, has recently given prominence to the Jew as an issue in the conflict by a proclamation setting forth vague promises of a reversal of the policy heretofore pursued by the Russian Empire in the treatment of its Israelitic subjects. Austria-Hungary has issued no such manifesto; but the status of the Jews within the borders of the dual Monarchy is strikingly suggested by the gibe, "King of the Jews," applied to the venerable Emperor Francis Joseph throughout the Russian Army since the war began, and authentically credited to the Grand Duke Nicholas himself.

The persecution of the Jews in Russia, it must be remembered, dates back to the earliest phase of the history of Judaism under the Czars. The early restrictive measures applied to the Jewish people, which gradually herded millions of individuals of a progressive and energetic race into the Pale, on the outskirts of Russia proper and within the zone inhabited by Poles, constitute a remarkable chapter in the history of civilization. In quartering the Jewish population upon conquered Poland, Russian statecraft accomplished the double purpose of weakening the Polish cause by introducing a strong non-Polish element into the heart of Poland, and of reducing the Jews to a pitiable economic condition by crowding them into an impoverished region.

Life within the Pale, amid poverty, degradation, and a hopeless inability to achieve any sort of material well-being, constitutes a gloomy page torn from the annals of mediævalism. But intolerable as this existence is, there is no hint in the Grand Duke's proclamation that it will be terminated by the conferring upon Jews of the right of travel and residence throughout

Russia. On the contrary, through the present reign occasional relaxations of the restrictive regulation have been checked with the utmost vigor.

Indeed, the present reign has been in many respects extremely reactionary in its treatment of the Jewish problem, despite the pretensions of the Czar and his Government to enlightened views and purposes. The pogrom of Kishineff is rather a typical than an exceptional incident of a much-lauded régime of tolerance and constitutional development. The activities of the Black Hundreds, which caused a wail of despair to go up from Jewish communities in Russia; repressive measures designed to exclude Jews rigidly from participation in corporations, and the revival of the long-discredited charges of ritual murder against Jews are not incidents of the dark ages, but events of to-day—the handiwork of the administration which now is appealing to the sympathies of the civilized world by a promise of equality for all subjects of the Russian Czar, including the long-oppressed Jews.

Enough has been said and written about pogroms in the past few years to impress upon the public mind something of the horror which the word represents. Enough, also, has been written about the circumstances under which these pogroms have taken place to convince the universal mind that, if the Russian Government did not actually promote, it certainly connived at the ferocity of the anti-Jewish mobs. The anti-Semitic attitude of the Government has been indicated convincingly by the active part it has taken in promoting judicial attempts to prove that Jews murder Christian youths for ritual purposes and in administrative measures for the exclusion of Jews from the commercial and industrial life of the country.

The Youdhinski case, which was the subject of international wonderment two years ago, and the failure of the prosecution to convict the Jew, Beiliss, of ritual murder, are comparatively fresh in mind. It is not generally realized, however, that the attempt to prove a long-exploded charge against the Jewish religion was not a minor enterprise, undertaken by local authorities, but had its inception in the ministry in St. Petersburg itself. Even the Duma, the symbol and expression of the Russian movement toward modernism, seriously discussed the subject of ritual murders and, by a majority vote, appointed a committee to examine the library of the St. Petersburg Ecclesiastical Academy in search of proof of the allegation that Israelites kill Chris-

tian children in order that they might obtain their blood for sacramental uses!

The latest, and in some ways the most significant, form of anti-Jewish legislation in Russia was put in effect only last spring, when the Ministry of Finance issued an order forbidding the presence of Jews in the directorates of corporations under a Russian charter or with Russian headquarters. No explanation was offered for this extraordinary regulation, but it was rigidly enforced, despite the energetic protest of the St. Petersburg Bourse, which in vain pointed out that the restriction at the outset exerted a disastrous effect upon Russian financial interests.

Not only in the mass have the Jews been subjected to almost incredible hardships and injustices under the present Czar, but a systematic persecution of individuals has been carried on throughout the Empire. The recent action of the Imperial authorities in depriving of civil rights four hundred Jews who had won the jealously guarded right of residence beyond the Pale, is typical and not exceptional. These Jews were placed under the official ban because they bore Russian-given names—an offense punishable with severe penalties under a pseudo-constitutional régime!

And now, as during the sinister days of the war with Japan, the Russian autocracy is seeking to strengthen its internal and international position by promises of sweeping reforms for its Jewish subjects, with the rest of the races under the Romanoff scepter. Do the Jews of Russia give the Grand Duke credit for a serious intention to carry out his pledges? Or do they realize that anti-Semitism is too deeply grafted upon the Russian character, thanks to a practically uninterrupted official campaign against the Jewish race, to make possible any amelioration of the condition of the Israelites within the Empire? The continuous stream of refugees who, in the initial stages of the war, fled in panic from the Russian armies into the interior of Austria, constitutes a sufficient answer to these questions. And the judgment of these refugees was entirely justified by the reign of excesses which signalized the first advance of the Russians across Poland and into Galicia.

[illegible]'s phase of the operations on the Eastern front the following dispatch addressed to the American Jewish committee of New York, from Jewish sources in Austria, under date of November 13, throws a lurid light:

"The Jewish member of Parliament, Mr. Reizes, requests to publish under his responsibility, in American papers, the following news: 'The merchant Trautner, who fled from Lemberg on October 10, reports that the Russians on September 29, started, without any provocation, a pogrom. Soldiers shot Jews, fourteen dead, thirty-eight wounded. Rabbi Brande dragged along the streets. Prayers in celebration of Yom Kippur forbidden. Jewish dwellings looted, stores plundered. In other cities of Galicia and Bukowina, Russians likewise committed murders, cruelties, violations on women. Jewish population's despair indescribable.'"

Such was the attitude of the Russian Government toward the Jewish population before the outbreak of the war, and such is the treatment accorded to the Jews by the Russian "army of liberation" during the course of the conflict.

The status of the Jews in Austria-Hungary offers a striking contrast to this gloomy picture of administrative oppression and arbitrary abuse. Under the rule of the Hapsburgs the Israelites enjoy full civil rights. They are subjected to no special legislation, and they stand on a footing of exact equality with the other races in the dual Monarchy. This state of affairs is not the outcome of a sudden necessity. It has been accomplished by governmental agencies through a series of years and in spite of local prejudices. Not only is the police power employed to give full protection to Jews against sporadic annoyance, but it is the fixed policy of the Empire to give active encouragement to the development of the race in educational, religious, and social directions. The dual Monarchy knows no ethnical barriers, no religious disqualifications.

The amelioration of the condition of the Jews in Austria began in the eighteenth century, under the enlightened rule of the Emperor Joseph II., and the removal of the last of the disabilities under which they labored became a certainty with the opening of the reign of Francis Joseph II. In 1848, at the initiation of the new régime, the right to the free exercise of their religion was granted to the Jews, and they were freed from special taxation. Jews were appointed to professorships in the national universities, and the first Parliament convoked contained a Jewish representation. In 1860 liberal legislation gave to the Jews the right to hold property in most of the provinces, and the constitution of 1867 abolished the last of the religious disabilities.

For at least two generations past the Jews have played an important part in the political life of the country. The Emperor, in carrying out his liberal policy, has called upon the Israelitic race for assistance in every phase of national life—in the Reichsrath and the Upper House, in the Army, the civil administration, and the educational system. Jewish names figure frequently in the highest positions in the Empire. Baron Anselm von Rothschild was called to the House of Lords. The late Professor Süss for many years was President of the Imperial Academy of Science. General Auspitz is one of the many Jews who have achieved distinction in the profession of arms. In finance, in the ranks of exclusive society, in the highest circles of industrial enterprise, are to be found Jews, such as Baron Springer, who, in addition to being an industrial power, is a member of the most exclusive club in Vienna. Count von Aehrenthal, the late Minister of Foreign Affairs, was of Jewish origin.

Not only to the emerged individuals does the rule of unlimited opportunity apply, but its workings reach the very roots of Jewish society; for the Government actively supports Jewish schools by the payment of the teachers' salaries.

The Emperor Francis Joseph has always taken a keen interest in the social development of the Jews; in their educational and charitable organizations. Only last year the aged sovereign to whom the rude wits of the Russian camp have applied the title of "King of the Jews" as a fling of opprobrium, endeared himself still more to his Jewish subjects by granting a site for a great hospital for Jewish children and by paying out of the privy purse 400,000 crowns to meet the deficit in the construction of a Jewish gymnasium in Budapest.

In every respect, both the Emperor and the entire machinery of State have afforded to the Jew every protection and every encouragement in the achievement of his racial destinies on a footing of equality with the German, the Slav, and the Magyar. It is no wonder, then, that in the present conflict, not only the Jews of the dual Monarchy but those of surrounding countries, where their race is oppressed, have rallied to the defense of Austria in her struggle against the forces of reaction.